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COMPANIES: WINNERS AND LOSERS  
 
ZINIAN ZHANG* 
 
This article is the first empirical study investigating the corporate reorganisation of 
Chinese domestically-listed companies. Through examining these cases, it challenges the 
assertion made by most of these corporate reorganisation plans and by Chinese state-run 
media reports that creditors and general public shareholders were the major 
beneficiaries. Through an analysis of the data generated from all forth-three such cases, 
this articles reveals that: First, unsecured creditors could have, on average, received 
61.37% more of their claims if the fundamental value distribution principle, the absolute 
priority norm, could have been complied with in these reorganisations; Second, if the 
general-public-shareholder-protection scheme issued by the China Supreme 3HRSOH¶V
Court could be rigorously implemented, 85.37% of the shares relinquished by general 
public shareholders could have been avoided. These two groups were not the winners. 
Instead, this article argues that it was local governments and controlling shareholders 
who were the real winners.  
 
A: INTRODUCTION 
 
&KLQD¶V listed companies are probably the most widely studied in China and abroad, largely because 
of WKHVHFRPSDQLHV¶LPSRUWDQFH in &KLQD¶VHFRQRP\the ZRUOG¶Vsecond largest only after the USA at 
present. 1  (YLGHQWO\ PRVW H[LVWLQJ VWXGLHV IRFXV RQ WKHVH FRPSDQLHV¶ FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH 2  and 
                                                     
* Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at Centre for Cross-Border Commercial Law in Asia (CEBCLA), School 
of Law, Singapore Management University. The author wishes to thank Professor Roman Tomasic for his 
helpful comments and the anonymous referees whose valuable suggestions have immensely improved this 
article. This article was presented at the Australian Corporate Law Teachers Association 2015 Annual 
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ConferHQFHSDUWLFLSDQWVIRUWKHLUYDOXDEOHFRPPHQWV$OOPLVWDNHVUHPDLQWKHDXWKRU¶VUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV 
1
 '%DUER]D³China Passes Japan as Second-/DUJHVW(FRQRP\´ New York Times, 16 August 2010, B1.  
2
 For examples, see X Xu and Y Wang, ³Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock 
&RPSDQLHV´ (1999) 10 China Economic Review 75-'4L::XDQG+=KDQJ³Shareholding Structure and 
Corporate Performance of Partially Privatized Firms: EvidencHIURP/LVWHG&KLQHVH&RPSDQLHV´ (2000) 8 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 587-57RPDVLFDQG1$QGUHZV³Minority Shareholder Protection in 
CKLQD¶V7RS/LVWHG&RPSDQLHV´ (2007) 9 Australian Journal of Asian Law 88-119; G Chen, M Firth, Y Xin 
DQG/;X³Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance: Efficiency GaLQVLQ&KLQD¶V/LVWHG
&RPSDQLHV´ (2008) 43 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 161-190; J  Fan, T Wong and T Zhang, 
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securities regulation issues.3 But one area of the research seems to remain untouched: the corporate 
reorganisationVRI&KLQD¶VOLVWHGFRPSDQLHVZKLFKDUHFRQGXFWHGXQGHU&KLQD¶VYHUVLRQRI&KDSWHU
114 enshrined in the newly-enacted P.R.C. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 (the EBL 2006).5 This 
article attempts to addresses this gap by investigating how the Chinese publicly-traded companies use 
the new corporate reorganisation law to restructure.   
This article brings together data on all forty-WKUHH &KLQD¶V domestically-listed company 
reorganisations which occurred between 1 June 2006 (WKHWLPHZKHQWKH&KLQD¶VQHZreorganisation 
law came into force) and 31 December 2013 (the date of the most recent cases). In general, the data 
relied upon here were generated  from company annual reports and general announcements, mostly 
obtained from the official websites of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange&KLQD¶VRQO\WZR
domestic stock exchanges. In some cases, in the absence of Stock Exchange data, materials for this 
study had to be obtained from a commercial database, the China Stock Market & Accounting 
5HVHDUFK 'DWDEDVH &60$5 ZKLFK KDV DQ DUFKLYH FROOHFWLRQ RQ &KLQD¶V VWRFN PDUNHWV DQG WKH
ILQDQFLDO VWDWHPHQWV RI &KLQD¶V OLVWHG FRmpanies. Furthermore, this article also draws upon facts 
derived from media reports, since most of these cases drew huge press attention because of their 
impacts on investors, nationwide and beyond.  
Through investigating WKHPDLQ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI &KLQD¶V OLVWHG FRPSDQ\ reorganisations, this 
article seeks to challenge the assertion made in most of these company reorganisation plans as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                     
³Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-,323HUIRUPDQFHRI&KLQD¶V1Hwly Partially 
PrLYDWL]HG)LUPV´(2007) 84 Journal of Financial Economics 330-357, etc.    
3
 )RUH[DPSOHVHH1&+RZVRQ³(QIRUFHPHQWZLWKRXW)RXQGDWLRQ- Insider Trading and CKLQD¶V
$GPLQLVWUDWLYH/DZ&ULVLV´ (2012) 60 The American Journal of Comparative Law 955, R H +XDQJ³Private 
Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A Ten-Year RetrospHFWLYHDQG(PSLULFDO$VVHVVPHQW´ (2013) 61 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 757, and G J Jiang, L Lu and D =KX³The Information Content of 
Analyst Recommendation Revisions ± Evidence from the Chinese Stock Market´ (2014) 29 Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal 1-17.   
4
 Although Chapter 11 is widely quoted, some readers outside the bankruptcy law research might be 
confused of this definition. In fact, it means Chapter 11 of the USA Bankruptcy Code 1978, which is for 
bankruptcy reorganizations and has been borrowed by many other jurisdictions. See generally at E Warren and J 
L Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors (New York, Wolters Kluwer, 6th edn, 2009) Chapter 8 on 
³&KDSWHU5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ´ especially.   
5
 7KHUHDUHMRXUQDODUWLFOHVHPHUJLQJLQWKHSDVWVHYHUDO\HDUVVKHGGLQJOLJKWRQ&KLQD¶VOLVWHGFRPSDQ\
rHRUJDQL]DWLRQV7KHUHDUH(/HH³The Reorganization Process Under ChinD¶V&RUSRUDWH%DQNUXSWF\6\VWHP´ 
(2011) 45 International Lawyer <5HQ³7KH³&RQWURO0RGHO´LQ&KLQHVH%DQNUXSWF\5HRUJDQL]DWLon Law 
DQG3UDFWLFH´ (2011) 85 American Bankruptcy Law Journal DQG<5HQ³Wealth Distribution in Chinese 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Law and Practice´ (2011) 20 International Insolvency Review 91. Undoubtedly, Lee 
DQG5HQ¶VVWXGLHVKDYHFRQVLGHUDEO\FRQWULEXWHGWR&KLQD¶VFRUSRUDWHUHRUJDQL]DWLRQODZUHVHDUFK%XWWZR
immediate key weaknesses can be spotted. First, their arguments or analysis are based on the incomplete data. 
For various reasons, only some high-SURILOHFDVHVKLWWLQJWKHPHGLD¶VKHDGOLQHVDUHFROOHFWHGLQWKHVHDUWLFOHV
and a comprehensive data collection has not been carried out. Second and more importantly, these articles 
DWWHPSWWRXQGHUVWDQG&KLQD¶V corporate reorganization law and practice through only examining some of 
&KLQD¶VOLVWHGFRPSDQ\UHRUJDQL]DWLRQV7KHVHFRQGZHDNQHVVFDQEHYHU\DFXWHVLQFHLQVSLWHRIEHLQJERXQG
E\WKHVDPHVWDWXWHWKHFRUSRUDWHUHRUJDQL]DWLRQVRI&KLQD¶VOLVWHGFRPpanies are, as previously examined by 
the author, operated in a quite different way from those of non-listed, or ordinary, Chinese companies. Given 
WKDWWKHPDMRULW\RI&KLQD¶VFRUSRUDWHUHRUJDQL]DWLRQFDVHVDUHIRURUGLQDU\FRPSDQLHVWKHLUFRQFOXVLRQVFDn be 
very contentious. 
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in many Chinese state-run news agency reports that unsecured creditors and general public 
shareholders were the main beneficiaries of these reorganisations. On the contrary, this article uses the 
data to argue that the real winners in these cases were the Chinese local governments and controlling 
shareholders. This article also seeks to quantify the losses incurred by unsecured creditors and general 
public shareholders. More importantly, this article analyses the unique character of the Chinese 
political economy in which the governments at both local and central levels tend to pursue short-term 
economic and political gains at the expense of the rule of law.  
7KLV DUWLFOH SURFHHGV LQ VL[ SDUWV 3DUW  SURYLGHV DEULHI RYHUYLHZ RI &KLQD¶VGRPHVWLF VWRFk 
exchanges on which the companies discussed here are listed; this Part also seeks to cast light on how 
ChLQD¶V VWRFN exchange regulators monitor financially-troubled listed companies. Part 2 describes 
&KLQD¶V QHZ FRUSRUDWH reorganisation procedure, which is at the heart of the EBL 2006 and has 
borrowed heavily from Chapter 11 of the U.S.A Bankruptcy Code 1978. Part 3 discusses the 
RSHUDWLRQRI&KLQD¶V OLVWHGFRPSDQ\ reorganisations, and analyses the main features of these cases. 
Part 4 illustrates why unsecured creditors and general public shareholders are losers and seeks to 
quantify these losses. Part 5 seeks to explain why local governments and controlling shareholders end 
up being the real beneficiaries. Finally, Part 6 offers a conclusion and suggests some policy reforms.  
 
B. &+,1$¶6672&.(;&+$1*(6$1''(0(67,&/,67('&203$1,(6 
 
China once had well-functioning stock exchanges before. But after the China Communist Party took 
power in 1949, all stock exchanges were closed down because of the communist ideology. In the 
1980s, however, China started its unprecedented economic reform, and one of major reforms was to 
rebuild its stock exchanges.    
17KH6KDQJKDLDQG6KHQ]KHQ6WRFN([FKDQJHVDQG&KLQD¶V/LVWHG&RPSDQLHV 
&KLQD¶VFXUUHQWWZRVWRFNH[FKDQJHVWKH6KDQJKDLDQG6KHQ]KHQ6WRFN([FKDQJHVZHUHHVWDEOLVKHG
in 1990 and 1991 respectively.6  In October 1992, a ministry-level regulator, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission,7  was created to regulate the stock markets.8  
                                                     
6
 6HHDEULHIKLVWRU\RI&KLQD¶VVWRFNPDUNHWLQUHFHQW FHQWXULHVDW=&KHQ³Capital Freedom in China as 
Viewed from thH(YROXWLRQRIWKH6WRFN0DUNHW´ (2013) 33 Cato Journal 587. See also an article describing the 
recent developmenWRI&KLQD¶VVWRFNPDUNHWDWS Cheng³$Q$QDO\VLVRI&KLQD¶V6WRFk Market in the First 10 
<HDUV´(2009) 12 Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 629-653. 
7
 The China State Council, Introduction of the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2006-11/28/content_455561.htm accessed on 29 September 2014.      
8
 See a discussion of the role of the China SecuritiHV5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQDW<:HL³The 
Development of the Securities Market and RegXODWLRQLQ&KLQD´(2005) 27 /R\/$,QW¶O	&RPS/5HY479, 
493.  
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The Chinese stock markets have developed rapidly in recent three decades. As shown in Figure 1, 
the number of listed companies increased from 14 in 1990 to 2,489 by the end of 2013,9  and, 
DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH:RUOG %DQN WKH PDUNHW YDOXH RI &KLQD¶V domestic listed companies amounted to 
US$3.7 trillion in the year 2012, the second largest after the USA.10   
 
It is noteworthy that one of the Chinese governmeQW¶s main objectives of opening these two 
stock exchanges is to use them to finance its state owned enterprises (SOEs). 11  Therefore, not 
surprisingly, the majority of listed companies in China are former SOEs.12 Though there is a lack of 
official statistics on the exact proportion, the following figures can give a glimpse on the weight of 
62(VRQ&KLQD¶VVWRFNH[FKDQJHV 
In 2003, for example, the available data show that 1,265 out of the then 1,300 listed companies 
(97%) were SOEs.13 During the recent decade, a growing number of private companies were allowed 
to be listed, but in 2013 there were VWLOODERXWHLJKW\SHUFHQWRI&KLQD¶VOLVWHGFRPSDQLHVWUDQVIRUPHG 
from the old SOEs.14  And, according to a senior Chinese national official in charge of SOEs,15 by the 
                                                     
9
 The China Securities Regulatory Commission, Statistics as of June 2014 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306204/zqscyb/201407/t20140714_257716.htm accessed on 28 
September 2014, and The World Bank, Data: Listed Domestic Companies, Total 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO accessed on 28 September 2014.  
10
 The World Bank, Data, Market Capitalization of Listed Companies 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD accessed 29 September 2014.  
11
 See Cheng, supra n 6, 631.  
12
 Chen, supra n 6, 597.  
13
 '&KHQ³Developing a Stock Market without Institutions ± WKH&KLQD3X]]OH´ (2013) 13 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 151, 155.  
14
 03:LOOLDPVDQG':7D\ORU³Corporate Propping through Related-3DUW\7UDQVDFWLRQV´ (2013) 55 
International Journal of Law and Management 28, 30. 
15
 6+XDQJ³6WUHQJWKHQWKH62(V5HIRUPV´ (2014) 3 Qiu Shi 4.  
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Figure 1: Number of Listed Companies in China (1991-2013) 
Source: World Bank 
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end of 2012, the state still remained as WKH FRQWUROOLQJ VKDUHKROGHU LQ DOPRVW KDOI RI &KLQD¶V OLVWHG
companies.16   
7KXV LW LV QRW DQ H[DJJHUDWLRQ WR VD\ WKDW &KLQD¶V WZR GRPHVWLF VWRFN H[FKDQJHV DUH IORRGHG
with SOEs, which may cast a shadow to the corporate reorganisation of these companies, due to their 
connection with governments at various levels.  
2. Special Treatment of Troubled Listed Companies 
Under the listing rules of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges,17 a listed company will be 
placed under Special Treatment (ST) if it reports, among other things, losses over a consecutive two-
year period, which is to alert investors that the company may be delisted if it cannot make profits in 
the following fiscal year. Such a company is classified ± and labelled ± as a ST company, but the most 
substantial LPSDFWLVWKDWWKHFRPSDQ\¶V daily share price fluctuation is limited to five per cent.18   
In theory, a ST company will be delisted if its financial performance cannot be improved as 
required afterwards. But as has been well documented,19 it is very rare for the delisting to be carried 
out in China. In most cases, these ST companies are brought out of trouble and will continue to float 
after shaking off the ST status.   
Generally, two sources of financing help these ST companies to survive distress. First, given that 
WKH PDMRULW\ RI &KLQD¶V OLVWHG FRPSDQLHV KDYH SDUHQW 62(V20 many ST companies are rescued by 
their parentV ZKR FDQ DFFHVV FKHDS ORDQV IURP &KLQD¶V VWDWH-run banks. 21  Second, Chinese 
governments can also subsidise and revive troubled ST companies for political and economic 
purposes. For instance, one research reveals that between 1993 and 2003, a ten-year period, the 
Chinese government subsidies amounted to fourteen per cent of the SURILWVPDGHE\DOO&KLQD¶VOLVWHG
                                                     
16
 /7LDQDQG6(VWULQ³Retained State Shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does Government Ownership 
Always Reduce Corporate Value?´ (2008) 36 Journal of Comparative Economics 74, 78 (discussing the state 
ownership in Chinese listed companies) 
17
 &KDSWHURI7KH6KHQ]KHQ6WRFN([FKDQJHV¶Rules Governing Listing of Stock on Shenzhen Stock 
([FKDQJHDQG&KDSWHURIWKH6KDQJKDL6WRFN([FKDQJHV¶5XOHV*RYHUQPHQWWKH/LVWLQJRI6WRFNVRQ
Shanghai Stock Exchange (1998) deal with the special treatment of listed companies. The Shanghai Stock 
Exchanges, Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange 
https://biz.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en/pages/p1075/p1075_content/en_sserule20090408.pdf accessed on 30 
September 2014), and the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange http://www.szse.cn/main/en/RulesandRegulations/SZSERules/GeneralRules/ accessed on 30 
September 2014.   
18
 See Williams and Taylor, supra n 14, 30.   
19
 See for example Chen, supra n 13, 163-DQG/7DQDQG-:DQJ³Modelling an Effective Corporate 
*RYHUQDQFH6\VWHPIRU&KLQD¶V/LVWHG6WDWH-Owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in a Transitional 
(FRQRP\´(2007) 7 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 143, 155. 
20
 Williams and Taylor, supra n 14, 30. 
21
 6HH<&KHXQJ//LQJDQG7/X³Tunnelling and Propping Up: An Analysis of Related Party 
TransactiRQVE\&KLQHVH/LVWHG&RPSDQLHV´ (2009) 17 Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 372, 383 (finding that ST 
companies are usually bailed out by their parent SOEs in China).  
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companies as a whole.22  More strikingly, a recent newspaper article reported that in 2012, one 
financial year, there were ninety-IRXUSHUFHQWRI&KLQD¶V listed companies receiving RMB107 billion 
of government subsidies (approximately US$17.2 billion) in total, on average each of them given 
some US$7.48 million.23  
All companies discussed in this article were once ST labelled at some point. Before 2007, some 
of the ST companies might have resorted to the aforementioned two means to survive, but after 
&KLQD¶VQHZFRUSRUDWHreorganisation law came into effect in 2007, some began to use the new law to 
seek a formal corporate reorganisation solution.   
 
C. &+,1$¶61(:&25325$7(REORGANISATION LAW 
 
Before 2006, China had fragmented legislations on corporate bankruptcy, and there was no formal 
bankruptcy reorganisation law. In 1986, China enacted its first bankruptcy law, &KLQD¶V (QWHUSULVH
Bankruptcy Law 1986 (For Trial Implementation) (the EBL 1986), which only applied for SOEs. For 
non-SOE enterprises, their bankruptcy had to resort to a EDQNUXSWF\ FKDSWHU LQ &KLQD¶V &LYLO
Procedure Law 1996.24  In reality, both laws were inadequately implemented, since there were a 
meagre number of bankruptcy cases every year.25 In the absence of a vigorous bankruptcy system, 
most failed enterprises in China exited the market by simply walking away. It is equally fair to say 
that without a rescue-oriented bankruptcy law some enterprises that only suffered from a sudden 
illiquidity crisis might have missed the chance to be rehabilitated, as a result of which the going-
concern value of these companies was unnecessarily lost.26  
In 2006, as part of the effort of reforming its commercial law, China promulgated the rescue-
friendly Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 (the EBL 2006) with the aim of establishing an effective 
corporate bankruptcy system and of helping push forward &KLQD¶VPDUNHWHFRQRP\ reforms.27  
                                                     
22
 Chen, supra n 13, FDOFXODWLQJWKHVXEVLGLHVWR&KLQD¶VOLVWHGFRPSDQLHVIURPJRYHUQPHQWVEHWZHHQ
1993 and 2003).  
23
 J Zhou, ³&KLQD¶V6WRFN0DUNHWV'LVWRUWHGE\*RYHUQPHQW6XEVLGLHV´ Guangming Daily, 24 April 2014, 
2.  
24
 X Zhang and C D %RRWK³Chinese Bankruptcy Law in an Emerging Market Economy: The Shenzhen 
Experience´ (2001) 15 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1.  
25
 6HH6/L³%DQNUXSWF\/DZLQ&KLQD/HVVRQVRIWKH3DVW7ZHOYH<HDUV´Harvard Asia 
Quarterly 1.  
26
 6HH::DQJ³$GRSWLQJ&RUSRUDWH5HVFXH5HJLPHV´Australian Journal of Corporate Law 
234.  
27
 6HH&'%RRWK³The 2006 PRC Enterprise Bankruptc\/DZ7KH:DLW,V)LQDOO\2YHU´ (2008) 20 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 275.  
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The EBL 2006 has three main procedures to deal with companies in trouble ± Chapters 8 on 
reorganisation, 9 on compromise and 10 on liquidation. Many have argued that the EBL 2006 is 
rescue-oriented;28 indeed, a number of its pro-rescue mechanisms can be easily identified.  
1. Encouraging the Use of the Corporate Reorganisation Procedure 
First, the EBL 2006 Article 2 allows all companies in distress to file for reorganisation, whatever a 
small or large company.29 This is different from neighbouring jurisdictions like Japan and Taiwan 
where only public companies are eligible for a formal reorganization procedure.30  
Second, under the EBL 2006 Article 7, both the debtor and its creditors can directly file for 
reorganisation before a court. And even in the case of an ongoing liquidation procedure filed by a 
creditor, under the EBL 2006 Article 70, the debtor or its shareholders could apply to convert it into a 
reorganisation procedure. 
Third, and more importantly, to promote early rescues, the EBL 2006 Article 2 allows a 
company which is not bankrupt but is likely to be bankrupt to enter into the reorganisation procedure. 
This suggests that a Chinese company filing for reorganisation does not need to demonstrate the 
existence of insolvency, which in turn may considerably encourage early rescue filings.31   
2&KLQD¶V'HEWRU-in-Possession 
Unlike in a liquidation or compromise procedure where it is always a court-appointed administrator in 
FKDUJH RI WKH FRPSDQ\¶V EXVLQHVVHV and assets,32 under the EBL 2006 Article 73, the debtor in a 
reorganisation procedure can request for debtor-in-possession, and if approved by the court, the debtor 
                                                     
28
 6RPHDUWLFOHVVKHGOLJKWRQ&KLQD¶Vnew rescue-centred Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. For example, R 
3DUU\DQG+=KDQJ³&KLQD¶V1HZ&RUSRUDWH5HVFXH/DZV3HUVSHFWLYHVDQG3ULQFLSOHV´ (2008) 8 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 113, Booth, ibid, Lee, supra n 5, 939, and Ren, ³The Control Model in Chinese 
Bankruptcy 5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ/DZDQG3UDFWLFH´supra n 5, 177.  
29
 =-LD³Issues of ChLQD¶V(QWHUSULVH%DQNUXSWF\%LOO´ (2006) 7 7KH&KLQD3HRSOH¶V&RQJUHVV*D]HWWH 
575, 577 (noting that the new reorganization law is open to businesses having the independent legal status).   
30
 6HH7(LVHQEHUJDQG67DJDVKLUD³6KRXOG:H$EROLVK&KDSWHU"7KH(YLGHQFHIURP-DSDQ´
23 the Journal of Legal Studies DQG-.:LQQ³&UHGLWRUV¶5LJKWVLQ7DLZDQ$&RPSDULVRQRI&RUSRUDWH
Reorganization Law in the 8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGWKH5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD´13 North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation 409.  
31
 +=RX³&KLQD¶V&RUSRUDWH5HKDELOLWDWLRQ6\VWHP± Theories and Application´ (2007) 25 Journal of 
China University of Political Science and Law 48. 53 (noting that a company which is likely to be bankrupt can 
file for reorganizatiRQXQGHUWKH(%/6/L³Drafting of New Bankruptcy Law and Credit Culture and 
&UHGLW6\VWHPRI&KLQD´ (2005) 1 The Jurist 12, 15 (arguing that a company likely to be bankrupt can file for 
reorganization under the new bankruptcy law), and G McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law ± An Anglo-
American Perspective (Glos, Edward Elgar, 2008), 123 (noting that a company filing for reorganization in the 
USA is not required to be insolvent).  
32
 The EBL 2006 Article 13.  
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itself can manage the company and reorganisation affairs afterwards.33  It is the Chinese version of 
debtor-in-possession.  
%XW &KLQD¶V GHEWRU-in-possession is somewhat different from its counterpart under the US 
Chapter 11 34  DW OHDVW RQ WZR DVSHFWV )LUVW &KLQD¶V GHEWRU-in-possession is not automatic or 
straightforward, 35  since it must be requested by the debtor and approved by the court after a 
reorganisation procedure has already been commenced. Therefore, literally, if there is no request, or 
the request is rejected, it is still the court-appointed administrator who stays in control. It is a 
conditional debtor-in-possession. 6HFRQG &KLQD¶V GHEWRU-in-possession, if granted, should be 
supervised by the previously-court-appointed administrator. Interestingly, such a structure is similar to 
what appears in the German corporate reorganisation law.36 Inspired by the German bankruptcy law, 
ChLQD¶V ODZPDNHUVH[SHFW to use the supervision of the administrator to curb the potential abuse of 
debtor-in-possession.37 
3. Creditor Protection in Reorganisation Plans 
Under the EBL 2006 Article 79, a reorganisation plan must be proposed within six months, and a 
three-month extension can be granted by court. To vote on a reorganisation plan, creditors are 
mandatorily divided into four classes: the secured, employee, tax and unsecured creditor class.38 The 
plan is accepted if it has been voted for by both a simple majority in number of creditors and a two-
third majority in claims in each class.39  
To a secured creditor, under the EBL 2006 Article 87, its debt will be fully honoured within the 
value of encumbered assets. Employee claims are given the priority over tax ones after which the 
residual value will go to unsecured creditors.  
To make sure that creditors, especially unsecured creditors, are protected, the EBL 2006 Article 
87 requires that the creditor-best-interest test, according to which creditors must be paid not less than 
in a hypothetical liquidation, must be passed if a non-consensual reorganisation plan seeks the court 
approval.40 At the same time, the absolute priority principle, which allows creditors to be paid before 
                                                     
33
 6HHJHQHUDOO\0)DONH³&KLQD¶V1HZ/DZRQ(QWHUSULVH%DQNUXSWF\$6WRU\ZLWKD+DSS\(QG"´ 
(2007) 16 International Insolvency Review 63-74.  
34
 See a comprehensive discussion of the US Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession at Warren and Lawrence, 
supra n 4, Chapter 8 especially.  
35
 Ren, ³The Control Model in Chinese Bankruptcy 5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ/DZDQG3UDFWLFH´supra n 5, 178-9 
GLVFXVVLQJ&KLQD¶VYHUVLRQRIWKHGHEWRU-in-possession).  
36
 ..DPODK³The New German IQVROYHQF\$FW,QVROYHQ]RUGQXQJ´ (1996) 70 American Bankruptcy Law 
Journal 417, 432 (noting that in Germany the debtor-in-possession must be monitored by the administrator).  
37
 ::DQJ³The Draft of the New Bankruptcy Law and Bankruptcy Corporate *RYHUQDQFH´ (2005) 2 The 
Jurists QRWLQJWKDWZK\&KLQD¶VGHEWRU-in-possession is designed to be supervised by an administrator).     
38
 The EBL 2006 Article 82.  
39
 The EBL 2006 Article 84.  
40
 ;:DQJ³Improving the Corporate Reorganization Regime´ (2010) 10 Journal of Kunming University 
of Science and Technology 28, 33 (noting that the creditor-best-interest test must be passed when a non-
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shareholders, must be applied for if a non-consensual reorganisation plan is submitted for court 
approval.41  
,W FDQ EH DUJXHG WKDW WKHUH DUH WRR PDQ\ VLPLODULWLHV EHWZHHQ &KLQD¶V Qew corporate 
reorganisation law and Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 1978, since China heavily borrowed 
Chapter 11 when making its own corporate rescue law.42 But the great challenge to China is how to 
implement the new law in practice.  
 
D. CORPORATE REORGANISATION 2)&+,1$¶6/,67('&203$1,(6 
 
Shortly after the EBL 2006 came into force on 1 June 2007, some listed companies in China began to 
use this law for restructuring. Before reporting the main characters of these cases, two basic criteria 
used to selecting them should be clarified.  
First,  this article only focuses on the reorganisation of &KLQD¶VFRPSDQLHV OLVWHGRQeither the 
Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which means the reorganisation RI&KLQD¶VFRPSDQLHVOLVWed 
abroad, like Hong Kong, Singapore and the USA, are not included,43 since the latter is somewhat  
processed in a different way. By this benchmark, for instance, the reorganisation of Zhejiang Glass 
Limited,44 a Chinese company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, is not included in this study. 
Second, this article investigates the reorganisation of companies which are still listed at the time 
of reorganisation. This means that the reorganisation of companies which have been delisted before 
the commencement of the reorganisation procedure is excluded. Take one case for example: the 
reorganisation of Shenyang Tehuan Limited, which took place in 2011, is excluded, since the 
company had been long delisted from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange since 2004. In fact, up until now, 
there are only two such cases after the EBL 2006 came into force.45   
By these two criteria, this article identifies the reorganisations of forty-WKUHH &KLQD¶V
domestically listed companies, which were accepted by the Chinese courts between June 1st 2007 and 
December 31st 2013, as demonstrated in Table 1 below.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
consensual reorganization plan seeks court approval, and arguing this test should also be used in a consensual 
plan submitted for approval).  
41
 Lee, supra n 5, 969 (noting that the absolute priority principle must be conformed to in a non-
consensual reorganization plan under the EBL2006 Article 87).  
42
 See Parry and Zhang, supra n 28, 113.  
43
 6HHJHQHUDOO\&KLQD¶V companies listed abroad at M Humphery-Jenner, ³The Governance and 
3HUIRUPDQFHRI&KLQHVH&RPSDQLHV/LVWHG$EURDG$Q$QDO\VLVRI&KLQD¶V0HULWV5HYLHw Approach to 
2YHUVHDV/LVWLQJV´ (2012) 12 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 333-365.  
44
 6HH'5HQ³Listing Pioneer =KHMLDQJ*ODVV)DFHV%DQNUXSWF\´ South China Morning Post, 18 April 
2011) http://www.scmp.com/article/965424/listing-pioneer-zhejiang-glass-faces-bankruptcy accessed on 16 
October 2014.  
45
 One is the Shenyang Tehuan Limited, and the second is Liaoning Zhongliao International Limited.  
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7DEOH&KLQD¶V/LVWHG&RPSDQ\5HRUJDQLVDWLRQV 
(Accepted between 1 June 2007 and 31 December 2013) 
6RXUFH7KH$XWKRU¶V'DWD&ROOHFWLRQ 
 
Company Court Accepted on Listed at  
 
Chaohua 
 
The 2nd Intermediate 
Court, Chongqing  
16 November 2007 
 
Shenzhen 
Xingmei  
 
The 3rd Intermediate 
Court, Chongqing 
11 March 2008 
 
Shenzhen  
Xiaxing  Xiamen Intermediate 
Court, Fujian  
15 September 2009   
 
Shanghai 
Taibai  Jiayuguan Intermediate 
Court, Gansu  
30 November 2011 Shenzhen  
Zhonghua  Shenzhen Intermediate 
Court, Guangdong  
12 October 2012  
 
Shenzhen  
 
Chuangzhi  
 
Shenzhen Intermediate 
Court, Guangdong  
12 August 2010  
 
Shenzhen  
Hualong  
 
Yangjiang Intermediate 
Court, Guangdong  
10 March 2008 
 
Shanghai  
Kejian  
 
Shenzhen Intermediate 
Court, Guangdong 
8 October 2011 
 
Shenzhen  
Taifeng  
 
Shenzhen Intermediate 
Court, Guangdong  
10 November 2009  Shenzhen  
Shenrun  
 
Shenzhen Intermediate 
Court, Guangdong 
14 April 2010  Shenzhen 
Xingtai  
 
Panyu Lower Court, 
Guangzhou, Guangdong  
11 March 2009  Shanghai  
Beishen  
 
Beihai Intermediate 
Court, Guangxi  
27 November 2008 
 
Shanghai  
Baoshuo  Baoding Intermediate 
Court, Hebei  
3 January 2008 
 
Shanghai  
Chuanghua 
 
Chuangzhou 
Intermediate Court, 
Hebei  
16 November 2007 
 
Shanghai  
Dixian  
 
Chende Intermediate 
Court, Hebei  
10 November 2008 
 
Shenzhen  
Beiya  
 
+D¶HUELQ,QWHUPHGLDWH
Court, Heilongjiang   
28 January 2008 Shanghai  
Guangming  
 
Yichun Intermediate 
Court, Heilongjiang  
9 November 2009 
 
Shenzhen  
;LQ¶DQ 
 
Jiaozuo Intermediate 
Court, Henan  
7 November 2008  
 
Shenzhen  
Tianfa  
 
Jinzhou Intermediate 
Court, Hubei  
13 August 2007  
 
Shenzhen  
Tianyi  
 
Jinzhou Intermediate 
Court, Hubei  
12 August 2007 
 
Shanghai  
Deheng  
 
Liaoyuan Intermediate 
Court, Jilin  
13 April 2010  
 
Shanghai  
Lanbao  
 
Changchun Intermediate 
Court, Jilin  
16 November 2007  
 
Shenzhen  
Shijian 
 
Yanbian Intermediate 
Court, Jilin   
30 December 2011  
 
Shanghai  
Danhua  
 
Dandong Intermediate 
Court, Liaoning  
13 May 2009  
  
Shenzhen  
Jingchen  
 
Jinzhou Intermediate 
Court, Liaoning  
22 May 2012  
 
Shenzhen  
(continued) 
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Company Court Accepted on Listed at  
 
Jinhua  
 
Huludao Intermediate 
Court, Liaoning 
19 March 2010 
 
Shenzhen  
(continued) 
Guangxia 
 
Yinchuan Intermediate 
Court, Ningxia   
16 September 2010  
 
Shenzhen  
Changling  
 
Baoji Intermediate 
Court, Shaanxi  
14 May 2008  
 
Shenzhen  
Pianzhuan  
 
Xianyan Intermediate 
Court, Shaanxi  
25 November 2009  
 
Shenzhen  
Qingling  
 
Tongchuan Intermediate 
Court, Shaanxi  
23 August 2009  
 
Shanghai  
Jiufa  
 
Yantai Intermediate 
Court, Shandong  
28 September 2008  
 
Shanghai  
Hailong  
 
Weifang Intermediate 
Court, Shandong 
18 May 2012  Shenzhen  
Hongshen  
 
XL¶DQ,QWHUPHGLDWH
Court, Shaanxi  
27 October 2011  
 
Shanghai  
Huayuan  
 
The Second 
Intermediate Court, 
Shanghai   
27 September 2008  
 
Shanghai  
Yuanfa  
 
The second intermediate 
court, Shanghai 
30 August  2010  
 
Shanghai  
Fangxiang 
 
Neijiang Intermediate 
Court, Sichuan  
7 December 2010  Shenzhen  
Jingding  
 
Leshan Intermediate 
Court, Sichuan  
23 September 2011  
 
Shanghai  
Haina  
 
Hangzhou Intermediate 
Court, Zhejiang  
14 September   
2007   
Shenzhen  
Changhang  
 
Wuhan Intermediate 
Court, Hubei  
26 November 2013 
 
Shenzhen  
Zhongda  
 
Wuxi Intermediate 
Court, Jiangsu  
26 April 2013  
 
Shanghai  
Xingye  
 
Huludao Intermediate 
Court, Liaoning  
31 January 2013  
 
Shenzhen  
Xianchen  
 
Xining Intermediate 
Court, Qinghai  
18 June 2013  
 
Shanghai  
Zhongji  
 
The 6th Intermediate 
Court, Xinjiang Army  
19 October 2012  
 
Shenzhen  
 
Twenty-five of these companies are listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and eighteen on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, as demonstrated in Figure 2 below. Their main characters can be 
summarised as follows. 
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1. Bureaucracy in Commencing a Listed Company Reorganisation Procedure in China  
Under the EBL 2006 Article 2, in theory, it is quite simple and straightforward to commence a 
reorganisation procedure: both the company and its creditors can file for reorganisation before a court 
if the company is bankrupt or is likely to be bankrupt, as noted before, and the court is liable to accept 
or reject the filing within fifteen days; in the event of rejection, under the EBL 2006 Article 12, an 
appeal can be made to a higher court. But in reality meeting these terms is not enough to commence a 
listed company reorganisation procedure, and the following extra requirements must be met.   
First, a local court must get the permission of the China Supreme 3HRSOH¶V &RXUW EHIRUH
accepting a listed company reorganisation filing. Such a restriction only applies for listed companies. 
Literally, this restriction cannot be found in the EBL 2006.  
To identify the origin of this restriction, this article managed to find a conference speech made 
on 30 May 2007 by the then deputy president of the China Supreme 3HRSOH¶V&RXUW0U;L;LDRPLQJ
Mr Xi stated WKDWORFDOFRXUWVPXVWREWDLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VSHUPLVVLRQEHIRUHaccepting a listed 
company reorganisation filing. 46  Five years later, in 2012, the Supreme Court reiterated this 
requirement in a judicial notice.47 But, up until now, there has not been any justification publicly 
disclosed by the Court.   
Little is known about the real intention of the Supreme Court to setting up such a restriction. It is 
a very high barrier, which may deter reorganisation filings, thereby against the pro-rescue spirits of 
                                                     
46
 ;;L³Enhancing the Roles of Courts iQ3XUVXLWRI6RFLDOLVW+DUPRQ\´(the National Court Conference 
on Civil Disputes Adjudication, 30 May 2007 Nanjing China) 
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/de1c054c852458fb770b56ce.html accessed on 17 October 2004.  
47
 The &KLQD6XSUHPH3HRSOH¶V&RXUWThe Minutes of the Seminar on Listed Company Reorganizations 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/sfjs_8249/201312/t20131205_239353.htm accessed on 19 
December 2013. 
42%
58%
Figure 2: Reorganisations of Chinese Listed Companies 
(2007-2013)
Source: the Author's Data Collection 
Companies Listed on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange
(18)
Compaines listed on the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange
(25)
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the EBL 2006.48 In fact, under the EBL 2006 Article 10, whether to accept a reorganisation petition is 
fully at the discretion of a local court, and the law clearly authorises the local court to assess the 
merits of petitions and to decide whether the reorganisation procedure can be commenced, regardless 
of a petition for a listed or a private company.  
But in reality, &KLQD¶Vlocal courts are unable ± or unwilling ± to cite the EBL 2006 Article 10 to 
defend their statutory discretion,49 thereby have to seek the permission from the Supreme Court.50 One 
of the negative consequences is that it takes too long for these filings to go through the acceptance 
procedure.    
 Second, supporting statements in writing from both a local government and the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission should be presented to the court before the filing can be accepted.51 Again, 
this requirement also seems to be unlawful, since its legal basis could not be found on any statutes or 
official documents. But this unwritten and court-imposed rule matters in reality.  
Courts may need support from local governments for a number of reasons. At first, the court 
needs the local government to tackle potential social stability troubles. More bluntly, this is because 
the local government is able to deploy police forces, in case of protests caused by disgruntled 
creditors, employees or individual shareholders in large numbers whose interests may be significantly 
affected in the reorganisation procedure.52 In nearly all reorganisation cases in China, there is always 
heavy riot police presence during the FUHGLWRUV PHHWLQJV 7KLV UHIOHFWV WKH DQ[LHW\ RI &KLQD¶V
authorities over the vulnerability of the Chinese society internally.53   
Also, for the court, a written supporting statement from the local government can serve as a kind 
of political guarantee, which could shield the court and especially the judges from being negatively 
assessed by the Communist Party local committee, in the event of a protest launched by affected 
parties. Social stability appears to be WKHWRSZRUU\RI&KLQD¶VFRXUWV-XGJHVZLOOEH disciplined or at 
least negatively assessed if a case-related protest happens.54 ThiVLVDOVRZK\&KLQD¶VFRXUWVKHVLWDWHWR
                                                     
48
 See generalO\%//LHEPDQ³A PopuOLVW7KUHDWWR&KLQD¶V&RXUWV"´LQ0<.Woo and M E Gallagher 
(eds), Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China (Cambridge University Press, 2011).   
49
 6HH7*RQJ³Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in Contemporary 
&KLQD´ (2004) 4 The China Review 33 (arguing the lack of judicial accountability in ChinD¶VFRXUWV\VWHPVHH
DOVR//L³7KH³3URGXFWLRQ´RI&RUUXSWLRQLQ&KLQD¶V&RXUWV-XGLFLDO3ROLWLFVDQG'HFLVion Making in a One-
3DUW\6WDWH´ (2012) 37 Law & Social Inquiry 848-877 (discussing the institutionalised judicial corruption in 
China).  
50
 See Howson, supra n 3, 955 (arguing that some government agencies in China tend to use internal 
notices to replace statutes when regulatory actions are taken).  
51
 The ShenzheQ,QWHUPHGLDWH3HRSOH¶V&RXUW³7KH6XUYH\RQ&KLQD¶V /LVWHG&RPSDQ\5HRUJDQL]DWLRQV´ 
WKH3HRSOH¶V&RXUW'DLO\3 March 2011, 8.  
52
 6HH&)0LQ]QHU³Xinfang: An Alternative to FoUPDO&KLQHVH/HJDO,QVWLWXWLRQV´ (2006) 42 Stanford 
Journal of International Law GLVFXVVLQJ&KLQHVHFRXUWV¶ZRUULHVRQSURWHVWVODXQFKHGE\OLWLJDQWV 
53
 See generally S L Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford University Press, 2008).  
54
 6HH&)0LQ]QHU³Riots and Cover-ups: Counterproductive CRQWURORI/RFDO$JHQWVLQ&KLQD´ (2009-
2010) 31 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 53 (noting that judges in China are assessed 
E\ORFDOJRYHUQPHQWVDQGWKHUHVXOWVZLOOGHWHUPLQHWKHIRUPHU¶VSURPRWLRQ 
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handle cases which involve individuals in large number. Without the special support of the local 
government, the court would be too nervous to accept a listed company reorganisation filing, which is 
always involved by a large number of individuals who are employees, shareholders or creditors.55  
0RUHRYHU IRU WKH FRXUW WKH ORFDO JRYHUQPHQW¶V LQYROYHPHQW FDQ PDNH WKH reorganisation 
procedure run more efficiently. In particular, the local government can persuade or pressure banks, 
most of them state-owned and large creditors, to make concession and to vote in favour of the 
government-backed reorganisation plan, thereby the reorganisation procedure can be concluded more 
quickly.  
In many cases, it was quite common for the local government to use the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission local office to establish an interim bank committee comprising bank creditors. 
This committee will lead all banks involved to take a coordinated action especially in voting on the 
reorganisation plan. Securing the local government support largely means having secured the support 
from large creditors. This can make the court more comfortable in conducting the reorganisation 
procedure.56  
Turning to the support of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, because this 
Commission has, through the two Stock Exchanges, a final say as to whether a listed company 
reorganisation proposal or plan meets the listing requirements, 57  the courts will have intense 
communications with the Commission to make sure that the approved reorganisation plans meet the 
regulatory requirements as well as to avoid embarrassment in case that the court-approved 
reorganisation plans are not recognised by the Commission.  
Soliciting the support from these three major public authorities can be quite time-consuming. It 
should be noted that all the permissions must be substantially requested by the applicant who files for 
reorganisation rather than by the court. This begs the question which party could afford to do so.   
2. $SSOLFDQWVRI&KLQD¶V/LVWHG&RPSDQ\Reorganisations  
Under the EBL 2006 Articles 7 and 70, as noted before, a reorganisation procedure can be entered 
into through two different routes. Out of all forty-three cases, it is found that there were six cases 
(14%) converted from existing liquidation procedures, three of them requested by the debtor and the 
other three by the shareholder. The remaining thirty-seven reorganisations (86%) were directly-filed. 
                                                     
55
 See N C HowsRQ³Judicial Independence and the Company Law in WKH6KDQJKDL&RXUWV´LQ5
Peerenboom (ed), Judicial Independence in China &DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVQRWLQJWKDW³HYHQLQWKH
context of corporate law application, Chinese courts may be seen acting in the service of state or party policy 
DQGLQFRQWUDYHQWLRQRIWKHODZ´ 
56
 Zhang and Booth, supra n 24, 11-2 (noting that judges need extra government support in handling 
corporate bankruptcy cases in China).  
57
 See generally G Chen and others, ³Is ChiQD¶V6HFXULWLHV5HJXODWRU\$JHQF\D7RRWKOHVV7LJHU"
EvLGHQFHIURP(QIRUFHPHQW$FWLRQV´ (2005) 24 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 451 (describing the 
UHODWLRQEHWZHHQ&KLQD¶VWZRVWRFNH[FKDQJHVDQGWKH&KLQD6HFXULWLHV5HJXODWRU\&RPPLVVLRQ 
15 
 
Out of these thirty-seven directly-filed, thirty-six of them (97%) were filed by the creditors. Bearing 
in mind that the six conversion cases were also originally filed by the creditors, hence, in total, as 
illustrated in Figure 3, forty-two out of these forty-three reorganisation cases (98%) were initiated by 
the creditors.  
 
Is this a sign that creditors in China had the initiative in using the new corporate reorganisation 
law for a rescue outcome? If so, it can be a strong indicator that creditors would be well protected in 
the subsequent reorganisation procedures. Since this question is firmly related with one of this 
DUWLFOH¶V DUJXPHQWV RQ creditor protection, a closer inspection is needed. Who were these filing 
creditors? 
In spite of the difficulties in unveiling the status of these creditor applicants, this article managed 
to find that most of them were the related or inside parties. %\GHOYLQJLQWKHGHEWRUV¶Dnnual reports 
and the relevant newspaper coverage, this article identifies that at the very least twenty-two of these 
thirty-seven filing creditors (61%) were the debtors¶ subsidiaries, shareholders or connected parties. 
They were not ordinary creditors. For instance, in the reorganisation case of Xiaxing Electronics 
Limited, DFFRUGLQJWRWKHFRPSDQ\¶VGLVFORVHGreorganisation materials,58 it seems that there was no 
connection between the company and the filing creditor, Xiamen Huoju Group Limited. However, 
after trawling through WKHDUFKLYHRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VDQQXDOUHSRUWVLWVRRQWUDQVSLUHG that Huoju was 
in fact RQHRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VPDLQVKDUHKROGHUs.59  
To the rest of the filing creditors, their status remains missing. But in view of the barriers in 
commencing a listed company reorganisation procedure, this article ventures to speculate that most of 
them were likely to be insiders or connected parties; namely, to ordinary creditors, it appears to be 
                                                     
58
 The Administrator of Xiaxing Electronics Limited, The Reorganization Plan of Xiaxing Electronics 
Limited  http://www.cninfo.com.cn/ accessed on 19 October 2014.    
59
 Xiaxing Electronics Limited, The 2010 Annual Report http://www.cninfo.com.cn/ accessed on 19 
October 2014.  
98%
2%
Figure 3: Applicants of China's Listed Company Reorganisations 
(2007-2013)
Source: The Author's Data Collection 
Filed by Creditor (42 Cases)
Filed by Debtor (1 Case)
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insurmountable to pushing a defaulting listed company into reorganisation in China. This may cast a 
shadow on creditor protection.   
 Why did these reorganisations prefer to use the creditorV¶QDPH to file? There are a number of 
reasons. 
 At first, filing under the name of a creditor can avoid convening an extraordinary general 
meeting of shareholders. Under &KLQD¶V&RPSDQ\/DZ$UWLFOHDVSHFLDOUHVROXWLRQmust be 
passed by an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders if the debtor company voluntarily files for 
reorganisation. Given that a listed company usually has tens of thousands of general public 
shareholders, convening a meeting at such a scale takes time and incurs extra costs (though in practice 
a small number of them will attend such a meeting). More importantly, the company must face the 
uncertainties regarding the voting outcome if the meeting is held.  
In the face of this burden, if the debtor can find an alternative to circumvent this, and if there is a 
creditor that the company can influence or control, undoubtedly the company will choose the creditor 
to file. The alternative is an easier way to avoid costs as well as uncertainties.     
Meanwhile, using a creditor to file for reorganisation can also avoid one of the filing hurdles 
exclusively imposed on debtors. Under the EBL 2006 Article 8, if reorganisation is filed for by the 
debtor, the debtor is liable to prepare and present a plan explaining how to deal with employee layoffs, 
potential or real. The court assesses whether the layoff plan is appropriate and will then decide 
whether to accept or reject the filing. But such an employment protection plan is not required if the 
reorganisation petition is lodged by a creditor. Hence, for both costs and convenience considerations, 
the debtor will do whatever it can to find a friendly creditor to give a hand.   
Moreover, and more subtly, filing for reorganisation under the name of a creditor can also 
alleviate the accusation of bankruptcy abuse. This could only be understood in the context of China¶s 
bankruptcy system. Although corporate bankruptcy in China has a very short history,60 it has long 
been accused of being abused by debtors, especially former SOEs backed by &KLQD¶V local 
governments.61 If a bankruptcy procedure is initiated by the debtor, creditors tend to be more sceptical 
about the potential abuse. In other words, a voluntary bankruptcy filing by the debtor is likely to invite 
accusation. In response, the debtor will try to use a creditor to file, since this can create an impression 
that the debtor is forced to enter into a bankruptcy procedure rather than proactively seeks to use 
bankruptcy. Clearly, to this end, the availability of a creditor who the debtor can control would be fit 
for purpose.  
                                                     
60
 6HHDQLQWURGXFWLRQRIWKHKLVWRU\RI&KLQD¶VHQWerprise bankruptcy law at R W Harmer, ³Insolvency 
Law and Reform in WKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD´ (1995) 64 Fordham Law Review 2563.  
61
 6HH4%DR³6KDQJKDL+DV1R%DQNUXSWF\$EXVH&DVH´3HRSOH¶V'DLO\, 22 January 2002, 1 (noting the 
widespread bankruptcy abuses in China, especially the bankruptcy of SOEs backed by conniving local 
governments).   
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Thus, using a creditor to file for reorganisation does bring the procedural convenience for the 
debtor, but it may do little to the effectiveness or achievability of reorganisations.      
3. Local Governments in Control of Most Listed Company Reorganisations 
Under the EBL 2006 Article 13, if a reorganisation filing is accepted, an administrator will be 
simultaneously appointed by the court to replace the debtor and to WDNH FRQWURO RI WKH FRPSDQ\¶V
businesses and assets. As to administrator candidacy, under Article 24, there are two options: a local-
government-organized liquidation committee or a licensed insolvency professional agency, including 
law or accounting firms.  
Regarding the administrator appointments in these forty-three cases, as shown in Figure 4 below, 
it is found that thirty-six of them (84%) saw the appointment made from the local-government-
organized liquidation committee, and the remaining seven appointments (16%) from the licensed 
professional agencies. This suggests that the local governments dominated most of these administrator 
appointments.  
 
As for the composition of the local-government-organized committees, first, without doubt, most 
individual members were officials from different local government departments. A typical case is the 
reorganisation of Guangxi Beisheng Pharmaceutical Limited in which eleven out of the thirteen 
committee members were the officials from the nine local government departments, including the 
legal, auditing, labour, economy, infrastructure, land, business and banking authority.62  
Second, all these committees were chaired by a local senior official, such as a deputy mayor of 
the city. For example, in the aforementioned Beisheng case, it was the deputy mayor, Mr Wen Zhen, 
of the local Baihai City Government, Guangxi Province who headed the liquidation committee. In the 
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case where there was state equity, usually the director or deputy-director of the local state-assets-
management authority would chair the committee. In the reorganisation of Xianyan Pianzhuan 
Limited, for example, it was Mr Wu Lishen, the director of the local Xianyan City State-Assets-
Management Authority, who presided at the committee.63  
Third, given that reorganisation always involves legal issues, most of these committees hired 
lawyers as committee members for advice.64 For example, in the reorganisation of Jin Hua Group 
Chloro-Alkali Limited, Mr Yanling Liu, a lawyer from the Beijing-based law firm King&Wood was 
hired as one of the committee members. 65  
In the rest of these committees where lawyers were not given the membership, it could be easily 
identified that lawyers were instead hired as legal counsels rather than as committee members in aid 
of reorganisation affairs. For example, in the reorganisation of Xinjiang Chalkis Limited, the lawyers 
from a Guangzhou-based law firm were contracted by the liquidation committee to advise the case, 
although they were not formally appointed as the liquidation committee members.66 Lawyer service 
was always needed, though they participated in different ways.  
For courts, however, appointing a local-government-organized liquidation committee as the 
listed company reorganisation administrator remains very controversial in China. 
On the one hand, admittedly, the EBL 2006 Article 24 does allow the court to appoint such a 
committee as the administrator. But, as argued by two prominent Chinese bankruptcy scholars, 
Professors Li Shuguang67 and Wang Xinxin,68 who were also the draftsmen of the EBL 2006, the real 
intention of Article 24 is to reserve such committees only for the bankruptcy of state owned 
enterprises (SOEs); in other words, for the reorganisation case of a non-SOE company, the court must 
appoint a licensed professional agency as the administrator. Although most listed companies in China 
are former SOEs, strictly speaking, they are no longer SOEs after being listed on the stock exchanges. 
They have become public companies. Therefore, it seems to be against the legislative intention of 
Article 24 for the court to make such appointments.  
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On the other hand, in most cases, appointing these committees may also lead to a conflict of 
interest and allegedly violates the EBL 2006 Article 24. To ensure the neutrality of an administrator, 
Article 24 stipulates that any party who has a direct interest in the reorganisation is proscribed from 
being appointed. However, as noted, most Chinese listed companies have state shares and even half of 
them are directly equity controlled by the state. In these circumstances, appointing a local-
government-organized liquidation committee as the administrator largely means appointing one 
shareholder to do the job. Clearly, these appointments seem to be unlawful.     
Interestingly, although in China it still remains a taboo to specifically criticize authorities in 
public, the above rampant breaches were immediately SRLQWHGRXWE\&KLQD¶Vshareholder activists, 
who accused, on internet blogs, that it is a breach of the EBL 2006 Article 24 for courts to make such 
appointments.69 8QIRUWXQDWHO\ WKH NH\ ZHDNQHVV RI &KLQD¶s legal system is that many institutions, 
including government-controlled law courts, do not treat laws seriously,70 as a result of which these 
alleged breaches remain widespread in listed company reorganisations.   
Despite most cases using a local-government-organized liquidation committee as the 
administrator, it is not the end of the story, since the debtor-in-possession may, as mentioned 
previously, in theory, be requested and granted by the court,71 which means the local government 
would cede control to the debtor, and this may somewhat alleviate the state dominance. But, in 
practice, it is another story.  
This article finds that, as indicated in Figure 5, out of these forty-three reorganisations were there 
only nine cases (21%) where debtor-in-possession was requested and granted; accordingly, in the 
majority of the cases (79%), the administrator remained in control. In other words, the landscape of 
the local government dominance LQ&KLQD¶VOLVWHGFRPSDQ\reorganisations has not been substantially 
changed by the theoretical prospect of debtor-in-possession. 
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In many cases, the administrator- rather than debtor-in-possession seems to be the only one 
realistic option, since at least sixteen out of all cases (37%) saw the FRPSDQ\¶VEXVLQHVVRSHUDWLRQ 
having ceased before the commencement of reorganisation. This suggests that many formal rescues 
were launched too late, and that it was impractical to rely on the debtor itself to conduct the rescue by 
granting debtor-in-possession. Terminating the business operation was largely accompanied with the 
GHSDUWXUHRIWKHNH\PHPEHUVRIWKHGHEWRU¶VPDQDJLQJWHDP 
Moreover, bearing in mind that the JRYHUQPHQWV DUH WKH PDMRU VKDUHKROGHUV RI PRVW &KLQD¶V
listed companies, for debtor companies, there might be no difference between requesting debtor-in-
possession and not. Before the reorganisation procedure, the government controls the listed company 
as the controlling shareholder, and after the formal rescue procedure commences, the government 
maintains its control under the name of the administrator. Therefore, to the debtor, it may not be fit for 
purpose to apply for debtor-in-possession: most of them are continuously controlled by the 
governments, no matter of being in or out of reorganisation.  
Although there were nine cases using debtor-in-possession, they largely existed in name only.  
That is to say: The debtor-in-possession was granted, but the key decisions were still made by the 
administrator. For example, in the case of Shaanxi Pianzhuan Limited,72 it was the administrator, the 
government-organised liquidation committee let by the local Xianyang State-Assets-Management 
Authority, rather than the debtor who made the key decision of the reorganisation issues, including 
choosing the company buyer, although the debtor-in-possession was artificially sanctioned.73 In most 
cases, with debtor-in-possession granted, instead of being allowed to fully control the company, the 
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debtor was mainly retained to maintain the day-to-day business operation. The control has been lost to 
the administrator, and it has never really returned.74  
To sum up, it was overwhelmingly the local government that controlled the listed company 
reorganisation in China. This may pose considerable threat to the protection of creditors and minority 
shareholders and affect how the value of these companies is equitably distributed.  
4. Value Distribution LQ&KLQD¶V/LVWHG&RPSDQ\Reorganisations  
With respect to value distribution, at the policy level, China might have the most liberal legal 
framework on this. Under the EBL 2006 Articles 81 and 87, the two fundamental value distribution 
norms, the pari passu and absolute priority principles, which are compulsory in liquidation, are only 
treated as the default rules in reorganisation.75 That is to say that affected parties in reorganisation can 
contract out of these two norms; the other side of the same coin is that if a consensus cannot be 
reached, under the EBL 2006 Article 87, these two norms must be conformed with.   
Before reporting how these two value distribution norms were applied, it seems necessary to 
look at going-concern value preservation at first. The corporate reorganisation regime would be a total 
failure if going concern value cannot be preserved.76  
This article measures going concern value preservation by calculating the debt recovery rate for 
creditors. Out of all these forty-three cases, secured debts were fully honoured within the value of 
encumbered assets, and two classes of priority creditors ± employee and tax authority ± were also paid 
in full. This is a huge success by the Chinese standard, since even secured debt could not be fully paid 
in an ordinary company liquidation or dissolution case in China, according to the World Bank.77 
Therefore, the recovery rate here is only a matter of unsecured creditors.   
Reorganisation is designed to prevent piecemeal liquidation, hence, there was always going-
concern value preserved, since liquidation was avoided in all these cases. In particular, zero returns to 
unsecured creditors have never happened. It is a posiWLYHVLJQRIWKHVWUHQJWKRI&KLQD¶VQHZ corporate 
reorganisation law.  
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By compiling the unsecuUHG FUHGLWRUV¶ UHFRYHU\ UDWH RI each case, this article finds that the 
average recovery rate for unsecured creditors was 25.14 per cent, which means on average unsecured 
creditors recovered 25.14 SHUFHQWRIWKHLUFODLPVLQ&KLQD¶VOLVWHGFRPSDQ\reorganisations. It does 
reflect a kind of achievement. Specifically, this figure would be more encouraging if compared with 
the recovery rate for unsecured creditors in &KLQD¶V company liquidations as a whole.  
According to the existing literature,78 the average recovery rate for creditors, including secured 
and unsecured creditors, LQ&KLQD¶VFRUSRUDWHOLTXLGDWLRQVis always lower than ten per cent. It is also 
widely observed that unsecured creditors get zero returns in most corporate liquidation cases in 
China.79 Thus, compared with less than ten per cent, the 25.14 per cent found here is something which 
should be celebrated. Such a figure is also somewhat encouraging even if an international comparison 
is made.  
In the UK, according to an article contributed by Professor Armour and others published in 2012, 
unsecured creditors on average recovered less than 20.20 per cent in randomly selected 
administrations (reorganisations);80 in the USA, one study, which examines Chapter 11s conducted in 
New York and Arizona from 1995 and 2001, finds that American unsecured creditors on average 
realised 52 per cent of their claims. 81  The comparison between these three jurisdictions is 
demonstrated in Figure 6 below, though it should be addressed that such comparison is considerably 
simplified, since many background factors have not been taken into account.  
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For example, the UK has a bank-centre corporate financing system, as a result of which many 
UK companies rely on bank lending secured under various forms of securities including floating 
charges for financing; in the event of insolvency, the majority of company value goes to meet the 
claims of secured creditors, most of them banks, at first, which means that little could be left for 
unsecured creditors. However, the USA has a well-developed equity market, which translates into the 
fact that many companies use equity markets rather than banks to raise funds, and in the case of 
bankruptcy because of the application of the absolute priority norm, creditors, especially unsecured 
ones, are better-positioned. This may explain why unsecured creditors recover higher in US Chapter 
11s than in UK administrations.  
&KLQD¶V VOLJKWO\ KLJKHU UHFRYHU\ UDWH IRU XQVHFXUHG GHEW WKDQ WKH 8.¶V FRXQWHUSDUW PLJKW EH
because that the Chinese companies studied here are all listed companies, which can be financially 
stronger, whereas the UK companies covered by the aforementioned study are ordinary businesses, 
most of which are small and medium enterprises and might have no substantial assets at the time of 
insolvency. Overall, this comparison is only aimed to give a glimpse over unsecured debt recovery 
rates at the international level, rather than to indicate the superiority of any jurisdictions in using 
corporate reorganization law.   
 Hence, generally speaking, it can be WHQWDWLYHO\FRQFOXGHGWKDW&KLQD¶VFRUSRUDWHreorganisation 
law has functioned well in preserving going concern value at least in these listed company 
reorganisation cases. But preserving value is one thing; distributing it is another. Now, attention turns 
back to how the value was allocated.  
First, as for the application of the pari passu principle, except three reorganisations (Tianfa, 
Tianyi and Lanbao) which did not publicly disclose the relevant information, as shown in Figure 7, it 
is found that pari passu was applied in seventeen out of the remaining forty cases (42.5%), and in the 
rest of cases (57.5%) it was relaxed. It is worth repeating that pari passu was only a concern of 
unsecured creditors, since all other creditors ± secured, employee and revenue ± were fully paid, as 
noted. 
25% 20%
52%
China UK USA
Figure 6: Unsecured Debt Recovery Rates in the UK, 
USA and China
Source: Combined by the Author 
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In general, the pari passu principle was relaxed in two forms. First, each unsecured claim was 
broken into several parts, and a variety of recovery rates applied to each of them. It is complex. An 
example is given to illustrate this. In the case of Xiaxing Electronics Limited, for instance, each 
unsecured claim was divided into three parts: the first RMB 10,000, the second between RMB10,000 
and RMB100,000, and the third over RMB100,000. The full repayment applied for the first RMB 
10,000 of each unsecured claim, the second part got a fifty per cent return, and the third part was 6.15 
per cent repaid.82 Under this plan, if an unsecured creditor only had a claim of less than RMB10,000, 
it means that this creditor got a full recovery. But for an unsecured creditor having a claim of RMB 1 
million, the 100 per cent recovery rate for the first RMB10,000 was substantially negligible, since the 
majority of its debt was covered by the lower repayment rate of 6.15 per cent. Under this form, 
obviously, small unsecured creditors benefited; large ones did not.  
Unlike the first form, the second was made exclusively in favour of small unsecured creditors. In 
this situation, unsecured creditors were regrouped according to the amount of their claims, and 
different recovery rates were made for different groups. The main point was that small creditors got 
more. For instance, in the case of Hua Yuan Titanium Dioxide Limited, unsecured creditors were 
separated into two groups: the first group each of them having the claim of less than RMB 6 million, 
and the second group each having more than RMB 6 million. The first group was seventy per cent 
repaid, and the second was 41.69 per cent repaid. Unsecured creditors with relatively smaller claims 
were particularly favoured.  
Whatever the forms of departure, pari passu was relaxed in favour of small unsecured creditors. 
This begs the question why the administrator, who formulated the plan but was not appointed by small 
unsecured creditors, tried to please this group of creditors. Two factors may offer a partial explanation. 
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At first, the administrator needed the votes of the small unsecured creditors to pass the 
reorganisation plan. The number of these small creditors matters. As mentioned, the reorganisation 
plan is not passed unless it is voted for by a majority of affected parties in number of each class. With 
the favourable recovery rate and even the full repayment provided, it seems unlikely for the small 
unsecured creditors to vote down the reorganisation plan. This is what the administrator expected to 
see.83 Arguably, these creditors were bribed to vote for the administrator-proposed reorganisation plan.  
Second, paying small unsecured creditors more was also aimed to prevent protests or at least to 
make protests less likely. Again, this could only be understood in the context of China. Chinese 
creditors may protest in the court house or directly march to the government if they feel badly 
treated.84 This scenario is precisely what the local government and the court are afraid of and will do 
their best to avoid. Protests are treated seriously as political threats to the one-party regime.85 Paying 
some creditors in full or more favourably is clearly a divide-and-conquer strategy, since the creditors 
who are paid in full will leave, which can in turn reduce the number of potential trouble-makers. The 
administrator, behind whom are the local government and the court, decided to pay some creditors 
more to buy peace.   
This strategy worked very well in some cases. For example, in the reorganisation of Guangxi 
Beishen Pharmacy Limited, under its proposed reorganisation plan, the first RMB50,000 of each 
unsecured claim was fully repaid, and this  meant that 122 out of all 226 unsecured creditors (54%) 
got the full recovery. So, with over half of unsecured creditors financially satisfied entirely, even if 
there was a protest, at least its scale could be more manageable or containable for both the court and 
the local government.86    
But the real concern here is that the local government under the name of the administrator was 
using the money of large unsecured creditors to pursue its own agenda. And the same tactic was also 
used in dealing with the absolute priority principle.  
Turning to the absolute priority principle, compared with the departure from pari passu, which 
happened in some half of all cases, the departure from absolute priority was the norm rather than the 
exception in all these cases. Precisely, in all forty-three listed company reorganisations, shareholders 
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retained part or whole of their equity in the reorganized company, although creditors, especially 
unsecured creditors, were not paid in full.   
By and large, the departure was operated in two ways. First, the equity of shareholders remained 
intact, whereas unsecured creditors had to fully shoulder reorganisation costs. This occurred in nine 
out of all forty-three cases (21%). For example, in the case of Guangdong Hualong Groups Limited, 
the equity of all shareholders was untouched, while the unsecured creditors only recovered thirteen 
per cent of claims each.87 It should be noted that most of such deviations happened in the years of 
2007 and 2008, when the EBL 2006 was first implemented. As time went on, presumably, it was 
increasingly realised that this way was excessively unfair to creditors; then the second way emerged 
later.  
In the second way (taking place in the remaining 79% of cases), instead of being shielded from 
bearing any costs, shareholders were required to concede part of their equity to increase the unsecured 
debt recovery rate. For example, in the case of Shenzhen China Bicycle Limited, two controlling 
shareholders surrendered ten per cent of their shares, and the rest of shareholders, including the 
general public shareholders, conceded eight per cent each; as a result, the returns to the unsecured 
creditors were increased by 6.31 per cent to 30.67 per cent.88   
Unlike the departure from DEVROXWHSULRULW\LQ86&KDSWHUV&KLQD¶VYHUVLRQRIWKHGHSDUWXUH
seems to have gone too far. In US listed company Chapter 11s, the departure from absolute priority 
did happen in many cases, but usually only a OHVVWKDQILYHSHUFHQWRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VYDOXHJRHVWR
old equity holders in order to reach a desirable consent.89 In this circumstance, however, the majority 
RI WKHROGHTXLW\ZLOOEHFDQFHOOHG2QWKHFRQWUDU\ LQ&KLQD¶V OLVWHGFRPSDQ\ reorganisations, the 
majority of old equity will be retained. This is the key difference between these two jurisdictions. 
One may ask the question why the absolute priority principle seemed to be ignored in all these 
cases. Again, WKLVLVEHFDXVHRI&KLQD¶VVRFLDOVWDELOLW\FRQFHUQVAs early as April 2006, two months 
before the EBL 2006 took effect, one senior judge of WKH&KLQD6XSUHPH3HRSOH¶V&RXUW, Mr Song 
Xiaoming, gave a presentation in a high-level international conference, the 5th Forum for Asian 
Insolvency Reform (FAIR), stating that in a listed company reorganisation FDVH³DFHUWDLQSURSRUWLRQ
of stock equities should be reserved for medium and small investors (shareholders),´ whether the 
company is solvent or insolvent, and WKDW WKLV LV WR ³SHUIRUP WKH IXQFWLRQ WR PDLQWDLQ VRFLDO
VWDELOLW\´90 In other words, the Supreme Court is of view that in listed company reorganisations the 
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absolute priority principle must be relaxed in the interest of medium and small shareholders. 
PUHVXPDEO\ 6RQJ¶V VSHHFK KDV EHHQ FLUFXODWHG WR DOO &KLQHVH courts, since except this document, 
there is no legally-binding bylaw which could be identified to justify the widespread departure from 
DEVROXWHSULRULW\LQ&KLQD¶VOLVWHGFRPSDQ\reorganisations.91 
But this policy gives rises to two immediate problems. First, it contradicts the EBL 2006 Article 
87. Under Article 87, as mentioned before, absolute priority is a default rule. In all reorganisation 
cases, it can be relaxed subject to consent between creditors and shareholders. But the Supreme Court 
says that in listed company reorganisations it must be relaxed regardless of consent reached or not. 
This policy is controversial,92 since it is against the EBL 2006 Article 87.  
Second, this policy has been expansively used and even abused by controlling shareholders at the 
expense of both unsecured creditors and general public shareholders. According to this policy, it is 
medium and small investors that are given special protection for the sake of preventing social unrest. 
,Q WKH FRQWH[W RI &KLQD¶V VHFXULWLHV PDUkets, these investors are the general public who register as 
investors in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and become shareholders of certain of listed 
companies. It seems clear that controlling and institutional shareholders are not on this special 
protection list. But the reality is that all shareholders used this policy to retain their equity.  
7RVXPXS&KLQD¶VQHZ reorganisation law did show its strength in preserving going concern 
value in the listed company reorganisations, since at least it doubled the returns to unsecured creditors 
by avoiding piecemeal liquidations. But concerns are raised in distributing value, as the two 
fundamental value distributional norms were often relaxed for political considerations. In some cases, 
WKHFRPSDQ\¶VYDOXHZDVGLVWULEXWHGTXLWH unfairly. In the event of unfairness, the court is empowered 
to correct this when approving the reorganisation plan at the last stage.  
5. Court Approval of Reorganisation Plans  
As noted, there are two different procedures made to approve consensual and non-consensual 
reorganisation plans respectively. For a consensual one that has been accepted by all classes of 
affected parties through a vote, under the EBL 2006 Article 86, the court will approve it if it generally 
complies with the EBL 2006. Article 86 does not specify what criteria the reorganisation plan must 
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meet;93 probably the law is intended to give the full discretion to the court. This is called a normal 
approval.  
By contrast, where there is a non-consensual reorganisation plan that has been voted down by 
one or more than one class of affected parties, the EBL 2006 Article 87 provides a list of conditions 
for the plan to meet. If the plan fails to meet one of them, the court will reject the plan and force the 
company into liquidation. This article summarizes these conditions as the four tests, which are very 
similar to those in the US Chapter 11s.94  
The first is the creditor-best-interest test, which requires that creditors be paid not less than in a 
hypothetical liquidation; the second is the pari passu test, which stipulates that creditors within the 
same class (mainly unsecured creditor class) must be paid pro rata; the third is the absolute priority 
test, which indicates that absolute priority must be complied with;95 the final is the feasibility test, 
which, as demonstrated by its name, means that the plan must be feasible.96 If all of these four tests 
are passed, the court may approve ± and force dissenting parties to accept ± the reorganisation plan. In 
the language of the corporate reorganisation law, it is called a cram-down approval.  
In these forty-three cases, all reorganisation plans were approved by the courts; no rejection has 
been found. In other words, the court confirmation of reorganisation plans seemed to be guaranteed in 
China. In particular, the normal approval was used in thirty-one cases (72%), and the cram-down 
approval was seen in the remaining twelve cases (28%).   
To the thirty-one normal approvals, at first glance, the court seemed to have done the right things, 
since all classes of affected parties had voted for the proposed plan. But great unfairness might be 
hidden, and this is mainly because of the oversimplified, deeply-flawed EBL 2006 Article 82 on how 
to form the class of unsecured creditors.97  
Under Article 82, creditors are divided into four classes ± secured, employee, tax and unsecured 
± to vote on a reorganisation plan. But the key problem of this Article is that it is silent on whether an 
unsecured creditor who is an insider should abstain from voting as an ordinary unsecured creditor, or 
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whether a new class should be formed to accommodate these insider parties.98Without categorizing 
unsecured creditors further, the majority rule is artificially followed, but in substance, the voting 
outcome might be manipulated by the insiders under the guise of the ordinary unsecured creditors. 
The China Supreme 3HRSOH¶V Court knows this, but no any policy action has been made until now.99 
Realistically, although China has no formal claim-subordination rules, courts can use the general 
SULQFLSOHRIHTXLW\HPEHGGHGLQ&KLQD¶V&LYLO/DZ 1986 Article 4 to restrict insiders from voting as 
ordinary unsecured creditors.  
A typical case can demonstrate the potential inequity caused by not excluding insiders from the 
class of unsecured creditors. In the case of Shenzhen China Bicycle Limited,100 the largest unsecured 
creditor, Shenzhen Guoshen Energy Limit, holding the RMB 0.46 billion debt representing twenty-six 
per cent of the unsecured claims, was included in the class of unsecured creditors to vote, but 
Guoshen was also WKHFRPSDQ\¶s controlling shareholder.101 With debtor-in-possession granted in this 
case, it means that the reorganisation plan was made by Guoshen and then was substantially approved 
by itself but under a different name as an ordinary unsecured creditor. Inevitably, the voting result had 
been considerably affected, if not manipulated, by Guoshen. For the purpose of equity, ideally, 
Guoshen should be barred from voting as an ordinary unsecured creditor at least.  
Turning to the twelve cram-down approvals, unfortunately, they are the real negative examples 
RI&KLQD¶VYHUVLRQRIWKHUXOHRIODZ102 As mentioned before, under the EBL 2006 Article 87, a cram-
down approval cannot be sanctioned if the absolute priority test is not passed. But, given the 
DXWRPDWLFGHSDUWXUHIURPDEVROXWHSULRULW\LQDOO&KLQD¶VOLVWHGFRPSDQ\ reorganisations, clearly, all 
cram-downs here violated the EBL 2006, because they failed in passing the absolute priority test.103 
The most serious concern is that some cram-downs were in fact supported and agreed with by the 
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China Supreme 3HRSOH¶VCourt, according to Professor Li Shuguang, a leading Chinese bankruptcy 
scholar.104  
Moreover, in these twelve cram-downs, at least there were six cases where the pari passu 
principle was also relaxed; again, it was a violation of the EBL2006 Article 87, since they failed in 
passing the pari passu test noted above.  
With respect of the creditor-best-interest test, it seems that this test was passed in all cram-down 
cases. In all reorganisations, there was a routine assets valuation procedure. Licensed auditors were 
hired to evaluate the liquidation value of the companies. At least from reading these reorganisation 
plans, unsecured creditors were always paid more than in liquidation. For example, the unsecured 
creditors of Hebei Baoshuo Limited recovered thirteen per cent of their claims each, whereas 
according to the assets evaluation report, they could only recover 10.12 per cent if the company was 
liquidated.105   
As for the feasibility test, sine it is considerably subjective in nature, most courts seemed to be 
unable to make a real judgement. In reality, it was more a kind of formality for judges to insert a brief 
statement in the reorganisation DSSURYDOGRFXPHQWWKDW³WKHFRXUWLVRIYLHZWKDWWKHSODQLVIHDVLEOH´  
In fact, no substantial assessment was made. Professor Zou Hailin, another leading Chinese 
bankruptcy scholar, argued that assessing the feasibility of a reorganisation plan involves business 
judgement and is beyond what judges as legal professionals can do.106 Very few judges are business-
minded, which means the feasibility test is largely not used in practice.     
After approving the reorganisation plan, the court will close the judicial reorganisation procedure, 
and the debtor is liable to execute the reorganisation plan.107 Under the EBL 2006 Article 90, the 
administrator supervises WKHSODQ¶VH[HFXWLRQ 
To summarise, VHYHUDO PDLQ FKDUDFWHUV RI WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V OLVWHG FRPSDQ\
reorganisations can be learnt. First, most of these cases were politically driven, 108  since local 
governments played the key role in supporting the commencement of these cases and in controlling 
these companies in the reorganisation process under the name of bankruptcy administrators. Second, 
these cases reflected the less-developed rule of law in China, since many statutory rules were not 
respected by public authorities including law courts. Third, the corporate reorganisation law itself did 
show its strength in preserving going concern value by preventing piece-meal liquidations, since the 
debt recovery rate was considerably increased compared with in liquidations. But great unfairness lied 
                                                     
104
 </LXDQG<*DR³&RUSRUDWH5HRUJDQL]DWLRQRI+DL-L/Y-LDQ´China Stock Market Weekly, 27 April 
2009 http://stock.jrj.com.cn/2009/04/2711394859465.shtml accessed on 15 January 2015.   
105
 The Administrator of Hebei Baoshuo Limited, The Reorganization Plan.  
106
 +=RX³8QFHUWDLQWLHVRI&UDP-'RZQV´ (2012) 11 Journal of Law Application 24, 25. 
107
 The EBL 2006 Article 89.  
108
 See an insightful discussion on this at J M Marsden and S Mui³/RFDO&RQFHUQV2XWZHLJK2IIVKRUH
&UHGLWRUV¶,QWHUHVWVLQ&KLQHVH5HVWUXFWXULQJV´Journal of Corporate Renewal 23.  
31 
 
in distributing the preserved value. The following parts turn to the questions who are winners and 
losers.  
 
E. ARE UNSECURED CREDITORS AND GENERAL PUBLIC SHAREHOLDERS 
WINNERS? 
 
The answer looks to be affirmative. To unsecured creditors, on the one hand, bearing in mind the 
creditor-best-interest test, all of them were paid more than in liquidation, as reported above. On the 
other hand, on average, they recovered 25.14 per cent of their claims, whereas their counterparts in 
liquidations could only recoup less than ten per cent. To general public shareholders, the majority of 
their equity was retained, and they were only in some cases required to sacrifice a small portion of 
their equity to pacify unsecured creditors, but they would have lost everything if these companies had 
had been liquidated. Thus, on the face of it, both unsecured creditors and general public shareholders 
seemed to be the winners or beneficiaries, but this article points to the contrary.   
1. Unsecured Creditors Were Losers 
An early study shows that the average XQVHFXUHG FUHGLWRUV¶ UHFRYHU\ UDWH LQ &KLQHVH FRUSRUDWH
reorganisations as a whole, including both listed and private company reorganzations, amounts to 
33.67 per cent.109 In view of the two different recovery rates, one question arises: Why the unsecured 
creditors in listed company reorganisations recover 25.14 per cent, but the national average for both 
listed and private company reorganisations is 33.67 per cent? Listed companies are supposed to 
financially stronger, because in China only the very healthy companies are selected to be listed, and 
because the performance of these companies is constantly monitored by the regulators to ensure 
adequate protection of investors.110 In turn the unsecured creditorV¶ UHFRYHU\ UDWH LV VXSSRVHG to be 
higher instead?  
One of the causes is soon spotted: Unsecured creditors in these cases were served with a low 
recovery rate partly because the absolute priority principle was routinely circumvented.  
As noted, for political considerations, the China 6XSUHPH3HRSOH¶V Court does not acknowledge 
absolute priority as a default rule in listed company reorganisations.111 Instead, the Court makes clear 
that the absolute priority principle must give way to maintaining social stability, thereby this 
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fundamental value distribution norm is put upside down. Inevitably, unsecured creditors bear the 
EUXQWRIWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ  
This article finds that if the absolute priority principle could have had been complied with, the 
average unsecured debt recovery rate could be increased from the current 25.14 per cent to 86.51 per 
cent, and in twenty-five out of all forty-three cases (61%) the unsecured creditors could get the full 
recovery. How are these figures generated?   
To count how much more the unsecured creditors could get, it is vital to determine the share 
price when the company is in the process of reorganisation. This article mainly refers to the price-
measuring methods used in the existing reorganisation cases.  
Following this approach, if the share price is set in the reorganisation plan, this article simply 
uses it to calculate the equity value of the company. In the case where the share price is not shown in 
the reorganisation plan, this article uses either the closing price at the date when trading was 
suspended by the Exchange or the opening price at the date when the company resumed trading, 
depending on which price is publicly available. In addition, in some cases, the share price was 
generated from the average price traded during the period of twenty market days prior to its 
suspension. Choosing these methods is also because they were used and preferred by many 
administrators in calculating share prices in other reorganization plans; in general, there is not a 
uniform method to do so.  
,QDGGLWLRQXVLQJ WKHDERYHVKDUHSULFHVLVDOVRLQWHQGHGWRPDNH WKLVDUWLFOH¶VDUJXPHQWPRUH
conservative and robust, since in most cases the share prices soared after the conclusion of the 
reorganization procedure; if the post-reorganization share price, which is always far higher than the 
aforementioned depressed prices, is selected to calculate how much should go to creditors, the vast 
majority of these cases may see the full repayment to all unsecured creditors; but this cannot be quite 
reliable due to the volatility of share prices in the equity market. For the sake of being conservative, 
this article uses the above methods to count what unsecure creditors are entitled, which are obviously 
less controversial. The counting methods are very complex, and they are listed in detail in Appendix 1.  
By such methods, for example, in the case of Beishen Pharmacy Limited, the share price was 
fixed at RMB3.00 per share in the reorganisation plan. Each shareholder was required to surrender 
twenty-three per cent of the shares to increase the recoveries for unsecured creditors. As a result, 
unsecured creditors got a 50.44 per cent recovery. But the real problem is that if the absolute priority 
principle could be conformed to, the equity value of RMB 911 million retained in the hands of the old 
shareholders could be enough to pay the cancelled unsecured debt of RMB 515 million. In other 
words, in the Beishen case, the unsecured debt recovery rate should be 100 per cent rather than the 
current 50.44 per cent if the absolute priority principle was complied with.  
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After obtaining all assumed recovery rates in these cases, this article reaches the estimated figure 
that the average unsecured recovery rate should be at 86.51 per cent rather than the present 25.14 per 
cent. Unsecured creditors were not winners; instead they might be the largest losers.  
Some may ask a firmly-related question why the company¶V equity was still valuable after the 
company had been financially bankrupt. At this point, equity is presumed to be worth nothing. It is 
strange indeed. Such a phenomenon does, however, exist in China; or it reflects the Chinese 
characters of its socialist market economy.112 In substance, the compDQ\¶V equity value is mainly 
because of its license to float on the stock exchange, which is called the shell value.113 Being allowed 
to float on either the Shenzhen or Shanghai Stock Exchange is more like a permanent membership. 
With delistings rarely taking place, the equity of these companies were still highly valuable.  
The second question is why unsecured creditors were so disadvantaged. A number of reasons can 
explain. At first, as mentioned before, all these cases were substantially initiated by the debtors 
themselves. Creditors, especially unsecured creditors, were quite passive as to whether or when the 
reorganisation procedure could be launched. In other words, it was the intention and the initiative of 
the debtor to use the reorganisation procedure, thus naturally it was unlikely for the debtor-initiated 
reorganisation procedure to be pursued in favour of creditors.  
Second, the reorganisation process was largely out of the FUHGLWRUV¶FRQWUROZKLFKPDGH WKHP
quite vulnerable. As noted, in most of the existing cases it was the local-government-organized 
liquidation committee staying in charge as the administrator. Creditors, including unsecured ones, did 
not have a say on the appointment.114 Even the Chinese courts were unable to refuse to appoint such 
committees, since courts are also somewhat controlled by the governments. Some Chinese judges also 
complain about this. 115  Admittedly, in theory creditors could request the court to replace the 
incumbent administrator, but this has never happened in reality. The situation would be worsened by 
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the connection between local government and debtor, since in most cases the local government was 
exactly the controlling shareholder.116 Arguably, it was a game played by and for the debtor.  
Third, as a consequence of being unable to control the reorganisation procedure, information for 
creditors was scarceHYHQZKHQFHUWDLQRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VLQIRUPDWLRQZDVDYDLODEOHHYHQWXDOO\EXWLW
usually reached creditors too late. Without having information of the company, creditors were easy to 
be manipulated. Under the EBL 2006 Article 61, the administrator is liable to provide an audited 
UHSRUWRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VDVVHWVWRWKHPHHWLQJRIFUHGLWRUVEXWXVXDOO\VXFKDUHSRUWwas too skeletal 
for creditors to know how many assets the company really had. For example, in the case of Hebei 
Dixian Limited, the company had 3,000 hectares of land but only admitted 324 hectares in its assets 
report; it seemed to be impossible for ordinary creditors to verify such information;117 thanks to the 
ZKLVWOH EORZHU RQH RI WKH FRPSDQ\¶V VHQLRU PDQDJHUV ZKR UHSRUWHG WR the China Securities 
Regulation Commission years later after the reorganisation procedure, otherwise such a fact may be 
hidden for ever.  
The audited reports might lack details, but another problem is that they always reached creditors 
too late. In practice, creditors were given a bundle of reports only at the time when the meeting of 
creditors commenced. Without having sufficient time to digest these reports, usually one or two hours 
later, they were required to vote on the reorganisation plan. Creditors were angry, but they were, in 
extreme cases, revenged with violence when they voted down a local-government supported 
reorganisation plan.118 Arguably, they were threatened to vote yes.  
In addition, the disadvantaged position of the unsecured creditors could also be attributed to the 
weakness of the Chinese courts. Courts are supposed to be the ultimate defenders of law. However, as 
argued by Professor HoZVRQ³&KLQHVHFRXUWVPD\EHVHHQDFWLQJLQWKHVHUYLFHRIVWDWHRUSDUW\SROLF\
DQG LQ FRQWUDYHQWLRQ RI WKH ODZ´119 As reported earlier, at the very least, all cram-down approvals 
issued by the courts were illegal, since these reorganisation plans failed to pass the absolute priority 
test under the EBL 2006. Unfortunately, the Chinese courts, including the Supreme Court, are unable, 
or unwilling, to act as the defender of law. The vulnerability of the courts in turn makes the creditors 
more vulnerable.  
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2. General Public Shareholders Were Not Winners Either  
Like unsecured creditors, general public shareholders were not well protected also because of the lack 
of representation.  
To a large extent, most of the losses of general public shareholders are made by controlling 
shareholders before reorganisation. As has been complained repeatedly by shareholder activists,120 if 
the company was not abused by the controlling shareholders, the company would not go bankrupt and 
did not need to resort to bankruptcy reorganisation for survival. For example, in the case of Shandong 
Jiufa Food Limited, WKHFRPSDQ\¶VILQDQFLDOLOOLTXLGLW\ZDVPDLQO\EHFDXVHLWVFRQWUROOLQJshareholder, 
Jiufa Group Limited WRRN DZD\ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V 50%  ELOOLRQ FDVK LOOHJDOO\ (tunnelling), as a 
result of which the company collapsed eventually in 2008. 121  Although the Chinese securities 
regulator has started to crackdown such abuses from years ago, but it seems that it has not gone far 
enough.122  
Turning to the general public shareholders, as mentionedWKHFRPSDQ\¶VHTXLW\ZDV entirely kept 
intact in eleven cases. Thus, it seems at least in these cases, shareholders, especially general public 
shareholders, were not victimized by reorganisation. But, in the remaining thirty-two cases, which is 
the focus of this section, the general public shareholders surrendered part of their equity to support the 
rescue efforts, and this article finds that most of these surrendered shares should not be conceded if 
the policy intention of the China Supreme PeopOH¶V Court could be faithfully materialised. 
As analysed, the Supreme Court requires that the absolute priority principle should be relaxed in 
favour of general public shareholders, not for controlling and institutional ones. Again as reported 
above, this controversial policy was expansively used, since both controlling and institutional 
shareholders took advantage of this policy at the expense of both unsecured creditors and general 
public shareholders.  
This article finds that in twenty cases the general public shareholders did not need to concede a 
single share if the absolute priority principle could have applied to the controlling and institutional 
shareholders (see Appendix 2). In these cases, if all of the controlling and institutional shares were 
surrendered, these shares would be enough to pay unsecured creditors at the same level, without 
forcing general public shareholders to concede anything.  
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For example, in the case of Shenzhen China Bicycle Limited, the general public shareholders 
were asked to give up 35 million shares to pay the unsecured creditors, and the controlling and 
institutional shareholders relinquished 11 million shares but retained 98 million shares. It seems clear: 
If the 98 million shares still possessed by the latter could be conceded according to the absolute 
priority principle, as a result, the general public shareholders in this case did not need to concede 
anything.  
By this method, with the current unsecured creditor recovery rate remaining unchanged, this 
article concludes that, in these thirty-two cases where general public shareholders were required to 
FRQFHGHGVKDUHVSHUFHQWRIWKHVHFRQFHGHGVKDUHVFRXOGEHSUHYHQWHGLIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
aforementioned policy intention could be fully implemented. Put it in a different way, general public 
shareholders paid 85.37 per cent more than they were required. They were not winners either.  
Why general public shareholders were disadvantaged? They encountered the similar situations 
faced by unsecured creditors, as analysed before. Even worse, unlike unsecured creditors, general 
public shareholders have another more acute problem: the collective action dilemma,123 since they are 
considerably dispersed. It is quite difficult to coordinate the vast number of these individuals, as it is 
quite common for a Chinese listed company to have over 40,000 general public shareholders.124 
Coordinating these shareholders is not easy. For example, in the case of Heilongjiang Beiya Limited, 
only the shareholders representing 426 million shares voted on the reorganisation plan, and the 
remaining shareholders holding 538 million shares, the vast majority of whom were general public 
shareholders, were absent at the meeting, notwithstanding the online voting system was also 
available.125  
 In a nutshell, the unsecured creditors and general public shareholders were not winners in 
&KLQD¶VOLVWHGFRPSDQ\reorganisations.  
 
F. WHO WERE WINNERS? 
 
To a large extent, local governments and controlling shareholders were the main beneficiaries of these 
reorganisations. Unlike controlling shareholders, local governments benefited from these cases in a 
subtle and indirect way.  
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1. Local Governments as Winners  
Local governments were likely to be the main winners, since reorganizing these companies served 
them with both political and economic interests.  
7KLV VKRXOG EH XQGHUVWRRG DJDLQVW WKH EDFNJURXQG RI &KLQD¶V SROLWLFDO HFRQRP\ China has 
thirty-two provincial governments, 333 prefecture governments and 2,861 county governments in the 
hierarchy.126 The most active local governments in these cases are at the prefecture level. With only 
2,489 domestically listed companies in China, as noted before, this means in theory each prefecture 
can only have less than eight listed companies. But given the imbalanced economy of China, in fact, 
some prefectures have fewer. For example, by the end of 2013, the Shenzhen prefecture in the well-
developed Guangdong province had 260 listed companies, 127  the Luoyan prefecture in the less-
developed Henan province had 10,128  and the Lu¶an prefecture in another less-developed Anhui 
province had only one.129 Thus, in practise, there is fierce competition between regions in China to 
fight for more IPOs and for having more listed companies.  
First, on the top of the gains the local government sought was the political image. Under &KLQD¶V
current political climate, the local government, especially its senior political leaders, will lose face if a 
local company is delisted. To save face, the local government will do whatever it can to maintain the 
listing of a local company.130 This may partially explain why the delisting is a very rare phenomenon 
RQ &KLQD¶V VWRFN H[FKDQJHs.131 Rescuing a local listed company is a serious political mission. For 
example, when Guangming Furniture Limited was ready to enter reorganisation in 2010, an official in 
the Yichun Prefecture Government explicitly told a newspaper ³VLQFH *XDQJPLQJ LV WKH RQO\ RQH
listed company in Yichun, our major government leaders are very serious to rescuing it and will 
ensure its success by whatever means´132 This is also echoed by a recent research,133  which finds that 
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local senior politicians are more likely to be promoted if there are more listed companies in the region. 
In all these cases, for the local government, its political goal was achieved, since all companies 
remained the listing status after going through reorganisation.  
Second, by rescuing these companies, the local governments were to maintain their own tax 
bases. In China, taxes are charged and shared between the central and local governments.134 The 
central government may pay little attention on where a listed company is located, but local 
governments do. To this end, this is why the local government will rescue the local listed company at 
any costs. This is also why in many cases the local government help the listed company to remain 
balance-sheet healthy through generous subsidies. In all these forty-three cases, it is found that only 
four companies (Shenrun, Deheng, Danhua and Yuanfa) removed the registered headquarter to where 
its main business operation took place. It means that the vast majority of them (91%) stayed and 
continued to contribute taxes to the local governments. As for these four dislocation cases, it remains 
unknown what kind of deals have been reached between two local governments behind closed doors.   
By contrast to these four dislocation cases, WKHUHDUHWZHOYHFDVHVLQZKLFKWKHFRPSDQ\¶s main 
business operation was in fact removed to the different province,135 which means that in principle 
their registered headquarters should follow, but it was not the case. This further convinces this 
DUWLFOH¶Vassertion that the local governments were winners, since these companies must pay taxes to 
the authorities where their registered offices are.136  
Third, in many cases, local governments were the controlling shareholders. This may also 
explain why the local courts remained silent when the aforementioned 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V JHQHUDO-
public-shareholder protection policy was misused by the controlling shareholders. The controlling 
shareholder was the local governments, thus keeping a blind eye seemed to be the best strategy for the 
courts. 
In addition, the ORFDOJRYHUQPHQWV¶JDLQVZHUHDOVR UHIOHFWHGDWPDLQWDLQLQJVRFLDO VWDELOLW\E\
XVLQJ XQVHFXUHG FUHGLWRUV¶ PRQH\ WR EULEH the general public shareholders as well as the small 
unsecured creditors, as mentioned before. And in the existing cases, inevitably, there were still some 
protests occurring. For example, on 12 December 2011, some general public shareholders of 
Yinchuan Guangxi Limited travelled to Beijing and protested before the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, and the SURWHVWRUV HYHQ EORFNHG WKH PDLQ JDWH RI WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V EXLOGLQJ 137 
According to the present political practise in China, it is the local government which is responsible to 
                                                     
134
 6HH.7VXLDQG<:DQJ³%HWZHHQ6HSDUDWH6WRYHVDQGD6LQJOH0HQX)LVFDO'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQLQ
&KLQD´The China Quarterly 71.   
135
 7KHVHFRPSDQLHVDUH&KDRKXD+XDORQJ.HMLDQ%HL\D*XDQJPLQJ;LQJ¶DQ7LDQID7LDQ\L/DQEDR
Pianzhuan, Jiufa and Huayuan.   
136
 Wang, supra QUHSRUWLQJWKDWRQHRIWKHORFDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VDLPVLQUHRUJDQL]DWLRQLVWRPDNHWKH
FRPSDQ\¶VUHJLVWHUHGRIILFHUHPDLQHGXQFKDQJHGIRUWD[SXUSRVHV 
137
 0/L³$:DYHRI*HQHUDO3XEOLF6KDUHKROGHU3URWHVWV´http://t.hexun.com/wdqhgtq/12576158_d.html 
accessed on 2 April 2015.  
39 
 
bring, either by force or by persuasion, these protestors back to their hometown. This involves costs. 
Such costs are usually passed to the company ultimately.  Though it seems impossible to unfold the 
size of these costs in each case, this article does find a staggering figure which may give a glimpse. 
According to its 2012 annual report,138 Sichuan Jinding Limited had to pay the local government 
50% IRU WKH ODWWHU¶V VRFLDO VWDELOLW\ H[SHQGLWXUH GXULQJ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V reorganisation 
process; presumably, the local Leshan City government used this money to cover all costs incurred 
from its social stability activities.    
2. Controlling Shareholders as Winners 
The controlling shareholders were the winners, mainly because they exploited thH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶s 
policy by circumventing the absolute priority principle.  
First, most of WKHFRQWUROOLQJVKDUHKROGHUV¶JDLQs were exactly the losses of unsecured creditors. 
In other words, the former sought to retain the bulk of their equity at the expense of the latter. In 
principle, according to the absolute priority principle, shareholders should be at the first line to bear 
WKH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI WKH FRPSDQ\¶V EDQNUXSWF\ WKH\ are not allowed to receive anything unless 
creditors, especially unsecured creditors, are fully SDLG7KLVSULQFLSOHLVDOVRXSKHOGE\ERWK&KLQD¶V
bankruptcy and company law, but controlling shareholders backed by local governments misused the 
FRQWURYHUVLDO SROLF\ RI WKH &KLQD 6XSUHPH 3HRSOH¶V &RXUW DQG WUDQVIHUUHG DOPRVW DOO FRVWV RI
reorganisations to unsecured creditors.  
As has been calculated, the unsecured debt recovery rate could have been increased from the 
present 25.14 per cent to 86.51 per cent if the absolute priority principle could be faithfully complied 
with. 8QVHFXUHG FUHGLWRUV¶ ORVVHV ZHUH PDLQO\ EHFDXVH ZKDW WKH\ ZHUH OHJDOO\ HQWLWOHG KDG EHHQ
grabbed by controlling shareholders. Admittedly, all shareholders, including general public and 
controlling shareholders, joined the feast, but controlling shareholders took the lion share.  
Second, on the side of shareholders, controlling shareholders also used their positions to force 
general public shareholders to unnecessarily bear the costs of reorganisations. As noted before, in 
many cases, the general public shareholders did not need to concede a single share if the controlling 
shareholders were subject to the absolute priority principle; as a result, the relinquished shares by 
general public shareholders in these cases were their losses, which should be instead born by the 
controlling shareholders.  
It should be noted that the losses and gains are inter-conditional between general public 
shareholders, controlling shareholders and unsecured creditors. If a metaphor of a food chain could be 
                                                     
138
 Sichuan Jinding Limited, 2012 Annual Report, 15, http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2013-01-
29/62078578.PDF accessed on 2 April 2015.  
40 
 
used, at the top are the controlling shareholders, followed by the general public shareholders, with the 
unsecured creditors at the bottom.  
 
G. COCLUSIONS 
 
This article has provided an in-depth investigation on hRZ &KLQD¶V OLVWHG FRPSDQLHV XVH the new 
corporate reorganisation law for restructuring and has answered who are the winners and losers.  
One point should be particularly addressed: Enacting and implementing a Chapter 11-style 
corporate reorganisation law in China has been proved to be a step in the right direction, since an 
enormous amount of going concern value has been preserved, as reflected in the increased unsecured 
debt recovery rate. This has been achieved mainly through using reorganisation to avoid piecemeal 
liquidation. But concerns are raised especially on creditor protection.   
To better protect creditors, first, to solve short-term problems, it seems urgent for Chinese courts 
to stop appointing local-government-organized liquidation committees as administrators in listed 
company reorganisations. As investigated in this article, most of the local governments are the 
controlling shareholders, thereby it seems natural for them to place their own interests ahead of 
creditors. The current imbalance between debtor and creditor could be alleviated by not making such 
appointments. And, as analysed before, appointing these committees is also against the spirits of the 
EBL 2006. ,GHDOO\ WKH &KLQD 6XSUHPH 3HRSOH¶V &RXUW FRXOG LVVXH D MXGLFLDO QRWLFH correcting the 
current practice. Meanwhile, creditors should be given a strong voice on the administrator 
appointment, as the current situation of creditors can largely be attributed to the little control of 
creditors in Chinese listed company reorganisations.  
Second, to solve the problems in the long run, China may strengthen its rule of law. Many 
problems of creditor protection reported in this article are in fact caused by the less-developed rule of 
law in China. Many creditor protection rules are clearly written in the EBL 2006, but in reality the 
public authorities, including law courts, violate them without being held accountable. This cannot be 
easy.139   
2YHUDOO &KLQD¶V OLVWHG FRPSDQ\ reorganisations also reflect the widely-held observation that 
&KLQD¶Vcurrent commercial law reform is still ³LQDWZR-steps forward, one step backward´SURFHVV140  
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Appendix 1: Assumed Payment Increase to the Unsecured Creditors 
 June 2007 to 31 December 2013 
 
Company Share Price Applied  
 
Absolute-Priority-
Principle-Bound 
Increase of the 
Unsecured Debt 
Recovery Rate  
Final Recovery Rate 
for Unsecured Debts  
Chaohua 
 
¥2.72 a share 
(the average price during 
the 60 days before being 
suspended) 
83.94% 93.94% 
Xingmei  
 
¥5.00 a share (the price 
set in its reorganisation 
plan) 
70% 100% 
Xiaxing  
 
¥3.71 a share 
(the price set in its 
reorganisation plan) 
34.19% 55.96% 
Taibai  
 
¥3.3 a share (priced 
according to a share deal 
in the reorganisation 
plan) 
58.31% 100% 
Zhonghua  
 
¥2.875 a share 
(generated from 
averaging the A and B 
shares priced in the 
plan) 
69.33% 100% 
Chuangzhi  
 
¥4.68 a share 
(the price set in the 
reorganisation plan) 
84.42% 100% 
Hualong  
 
¥3.65 a share 
(the price referred in a 
recent share deal)  
Missing  Missing  
Kejian  
 
¥11.25 a share 
(priced in its 
reorganisation plan) 
47.03% 82.28% 
Taifeng  
 
¥8.64 a share 
(priced in its 
reorganisation plan) 
79.67% 100% 
Shenrun  
 
¥8.535 a share 
(generated by averaging 
the A and B shares 
priced in its 
reorganisation plan) 
69.95% 100% 
Xingtai  
 
 
 
¥6.9 a share 
(the price generated 
from an auction, later 
the market price was 
speculated to ¥15.58 a 
share) 
78.23% 100% 
Beishen  
 
¥3.00 a share (set in its 
reorganisation plan) 
49.56% 100% 
Baoshuo  
 
¥6.00 a share (priced in 
its 2008 reorganisation 
plan) 
31.46% 44.46% 
 
 
Chuanghua 
 
¥5 a share  
(priced in its 
reorganisation plan)  
38.15% 49.59% 
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Company Share Price Applied  
 
Absolute-Priority-
Principle-Bound 
Increase of the 
Unsecured Debt 
Recovery Rate  
Final Recovery Rate 
for Unsecured Debts  
Dixian  
 
¥2.1 a share 
(the market price shortly 
after the reorganisation) 
98% 100% 
Beiya  
 
¥3.5 a share (the average 
price during the three 
months before being 
suspended) 
81% 100% 
Guangming  
 
¥12.52 a share 
(generated from a share 
transaction during the 
reorganisation) 
82% 100% 
;LQ¶DQ 
 
¥2.92 a publicly circular 
share, and ¥1.28 a non-
circular share   
36.78% 53.83% 
Tianfa  
 
¥4.445 a share 
(the average price during 
the twenty days before 
being suspended)  
82.27% 100% 
Tianyi  
 
¥4.33 
(the average price during 
the twenty days before 
being suspended)  
70.82% 80.89% 
Deheng  
 
¥5.28 a share 
(the price of the shares 
sold to the strategic 
investor) 
58.15% 100% 
Lanbao  
 
¥0.88 a share 
(the average price during 
the twenty days before 
being suspended) 
12.27% 34.27% 
Shijian 
 
¥3.03 a share 
(the concluding price on 
the day of opening the 
reorganisation 
procedure) 
83.24% 93.24% 
Danhua  
 
¥3.64 a share 
(priced in its 
reorganisation plan) 
78.7% 100% 
Jingchen  
 
¥6.16 a share 
(the closing price on the 
day of being suspended) 
95% 100% 
Jinhua  
 
¥3.9 a share (the starting 
price set in a subsequent 
auction by the company) 
95% 100% 
Guangxia 
 
¥7 a share 
(the closing price on the 
day of being suspended) 
50% 100% 
 
 
Changling  
  
¥6.34 a share 
(priced in its 
reorganisation plan) 
82% 100% 
Pianzhuan  
 
N/A 
(already fully paid)  
N/A N/A 
Qingling  
 
¥5.78 a share  
(priced in its 
reorganisation plan) 
50% 100% 
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Company Share Price Applied  
 
Absolute-Priority-
Principle-Bound 
Increase of the 
Unsecured Debt 
Recovery Rate  
Final Recovery Rate 
for Unsecured Debts  
Jiufa ¥2.15 a share 
(priced in its 
reorganisation plan)  
15.08% 35.56% 
Hailong  
 
¥2.93 a share 
(the closing price on the 
day of entering 
reorganisation)  
36.12% 76.12% 
Hongshen  
 
¥4.32 a share  
(priced in its 
reorganisation plan) 
88% 100% 
Huayuan  
 
¥4.37 a share 
(priced in its 
reorganisation plan) 
69.49% 83.91% 
Yuanfa  
 
¥6.92 a share (priced in 
its reorganisation plan, 
and also the average 
price during the twenty 
days before being 
suspended)  
24.06% 100% 
Fangxiang 
 
¥3.82 a share (priced in 
its reorganisation plan, 
also the closing price on 
the day of being 
suspended) 
55.49% 75.17% 
Jingding  
 
¥3.8 a share (priced in 
its reorganisation plan)  
 
82% 100% 
Haina  
 
¥7.2 a share (the closing 
price on the day of being 
suspended by the stock 
exchange)  
74.65% 100% 
Changhang  
 
¥2.53 a share 
(priced in its 
reorganisation plan, also 
the closing price on the 
day of being suspended 
by the stock exchange) 
37.32% 48.96% 
Zhongda  
  
¥2.1 a share  
(priced in its 
reorganisation plan)  
70.4% 100% 
 
 
Xingye  
 
¥2.41 a share 
(the closing price on the 
day of opening the 
reorganisation) 
44.13% 49.13% 
Xianchen  
 
¥8.00 a share  
(the price of the shares 
sold to an investor by 
the administrator later) 
97% 100% 
Zhongji  
(ѝสᇎъ) 
¥2.5 a share 
(evaluated by an official 
evaluating firm)  
35.58% 89.44% 
 
Average  
 
  
62.90% 
86.51% 
(in 25 out of 41 (61%)  cases, 
unsecured creditors could have 
been fully paid)  
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Appendix 2: Assumed Advantages to the General Public Shareholders 
 June 2007 to 31 December 2013 
 
Company Shares Conceded by 
the General Public 
Shareholders 
 
 
 
 
(shares) 
The Remaining 
Shares Possessed by 
the Control and 
Non-Circular 
Shareholders 
 
 
(shares) 
The Remaining Shares Possessed by 
Control and Non-Circular 
Shareholders out of the Shares 
Conceded by General Public 
Shareholders  
(%) 
(the preventable loss of the general 
public shareholders)  
Chaohua N/A N/A N/A 
Xingmei  N/A N/A N/A 
Xiaxing  24,463,037 139,672,203 More than 100% 
Taibai  N/A N/A N/A 
Zhonghua 35,370,070 98,299,817 More than 100% 
Chuangzhi  57,994,320 39,611,130 68.30% 
Hualong  N/A N/A N/A 
Kejian  26,784,163 38,768,400 More than 100% 
Taifeng  18,849,303 144,021,257 More than 100% 
Shenrun  10,945,500 39,685,143 More than 100% 
Xingtai  4,867,215 115,624,761 More than 100% 
Beishen  71,588,733 64,324,528 89.85% 
Baoshuo  40,295,784 83,996,769 More than 100% 
Chuanghua 6,813,915 210,998,483 More than 100% 
Dixian N/A N/A N/A 
Beiya  N/A N/A N/A 
Guangming  2,008,600 89,318,325 More than 100% 
;LQ¶DQ 7,375,679 26,442,772 More than 100% 
Tianfa  N/A N/A N/A 
Tianyi  N/A N/A N/A 
Deheng  29,426,283 11,122,180 37.80% 
Lanbao  N/A N/A N/A 
Shijian 60,386,904 70,002,146 More than 100% 
Danhua 50,700,000 86,529,867 More than 100% 
Jingchen  54,891,780 27,755,280 50.56% 
Jinhua  89,923,200 266,179,200 More than 100% 
Guangxia 82,968,977 7,483,400 9.02% 
Changling  24,206,332 41,754,520 More than 100% 
Pianzhuan  N/A N/A N/A 
Qingling  104,345,643 93,427,425 89.54% 
Jiufa  43,245,467 31,837,607 73.62% 
Hailong 126,403,439 176,684,732 More than 100% 
Hongshen  23,790,543 33,589,968 More than 100% 
Huayuan  85,410,900 15,105,870 17.69% 
Yuanfa  97,627,600 151,510,400 More than 100% 
Fangxiang 43,980,444 113,109,955 More than 100% 
Jingding  64,219,577 53,717,587 83.65% 
Haina  N/A N/A N/A 
Changhang  247,218,252 180,285,800 72.93% 
Zhongda  153,989,758 227,466,836 More than 100% 
Xingye  274,010,858 332,607,048 More than 100% 
Xianchen  22,414,589 10,683,725 47.66% 
Zhongji  186,813,818 170,695,084 91.37% 
 
 
(continued) 
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Company Shares Conceded by 
the General Public 
Shareholders 
 
 
 
 
(shares) 
The Remaining 
Shares Possessed by 
the Control and 
Non-Circular 
Shareholders 
 
 
(shares) 
The Remaining Shares Possessed by 
Control and Non-Circular 
Shareholders out of the Shares 
Conceded by General Public 
Shareholders  
(%) 
(the preventable loss of the general 
public shareholders)  
 
 
 
 
Average  
 
 
 
  Except the eleven reorganisations 
where all previous shares remained 
intact, the general public shareholders 
had, on average, 85.37 per cent 
preventable losses in the remaining 
thirty-two cases if the policy of the 
China Supreme 3HRSOH¶V&RXUWFRXOG
be adequately implemented. In 
particular, in twenty out of these 
thirty-two cases (62.5%), the losses of 
the general public shareholders could 
have been one hundred per cent 
avoided.    
 
